

Constructing an Innovative Model of International Security in Information Society

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Abstract

The purpose of the article is to explore into methodological potentials to understand international security in the information society. The article applied renovated Weberian model of social control, adding informability to formal rationality and establishing a three-dimensional coordinate system. The background of contemporary international security is a transition from pre-information society to the information society. Based on informability, to contemporary international security are posed multiple challenges, to which ideal models of informed formal rationality can provide explanatory solutions. Some of the most innovative topics in international security can be spotted. The article is concluded with optimistic view with application of this updated model in understanding international security.

Keywords

International security; International policy; International law; International politics; Geopolitics; Collective security; Informed formal rationality

Introduction

Since the ending of large devastation involved in World War I and World War II, and the huge mobilization of personnel resources and consumption of material resources by the Cold War, human society in the world today penetrates one of the best stages in its history. Europe has at all times been located in the main battle fields of these wars. But today the European Union (EU) is

also witnessing one of its most prosperous phases of development, even though the United Kingdom decided in a 2016 referendum to exit itself from the EU and the potential impact of the exit on the EU as a whole is very difficult to evaluate. In other parts of the world, there are similar tendencies, except those hotspots in the Middle East. In fact, many of the unease and restlessness in other parts of the world are related to those hotspots. However, in any sense, we can already safely say that international politics welcomes its abundant fruits by dissolving some other dangers, threats and risks in some other domains and some other places. For example, international relations reviewers might find that overall threats on international security have been significantly reduced due to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the enlargement of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), suffering of the US from years of economic crisis and declining of its comparative national power due to emergence of developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, etc. Today's world does not eliminate all battlegrounds, but it facilitate smaller ones; it is more like an arena where some are making efforts to contain others, or at least some are thinking as and fearing of being contained. The extreme of the current examples is the uncertainty created by the US administration under the leadership of President Trump, who publicly defends the US benefits by imposing pressures on other countries through politically- and economically-oriented punishments.

Nevertheless, we still have the anxiety of taking some examples to locates some of the risks in the field of international security, particularly, in the EU: problem of massive violent attacks and problem of massive immigration are now on the brink of chaos. Millions of immigrants are flowing into Europe each year. This forms a situation that the European Union is willing to embrace but is in its difficulties to contain. The European Union has made greater efforts than any other non-geopolitical players, stakeholders and decision-makers in the world to welcome those who escape wars and turmoil in their home countries. Among them, there has not been a lack of opportunists who were looking for a better life in a better established society rather than making efforts to construct their own life in their own society, where stable regimes would be challenged by the Western standard as autocratic, but change of these regimes would render people there into only two choices, either fighting or fleeing. Ironically, the Westernized or West-transplanted political system and lifestyle proved to be unsustainable in their home countries, and their political system, social control and personal career mostly ended up in irreversible and irresistible failure. Of course, not all the changes of regimes lead to a Westernized system, but more or less anarchic status, such as the case in Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and the ongoing crumbling Syria.

The generous acceptance of immigrants is to some extent encouraged by a past success of integrating refuge-seekers into the European society, for example, those Vietnamese Chinese people (best known as Vietnamese boat people) arriving in the 1970s and 1980s. Ideologically, those Vietnamese Chinese people were originally mostly atheism and non-political. They had no bible and they had no god. They were easy to accept a mainstream religious belief existing in the

Europe if they wished. If they did not wish, they at least did not require a change of the existing social order of the Europe. The European authorities neglect the fact that those Vietnamese Chinese people differentiated from those from other regions by that they usually held no standpoint on local politics and religious belief in their new hosting countries. Their cultural background means that they will never shake the foundation of the Western world. For the Western world, their existence posed no security problem and no ideological threat. In fact, since the surrender of the Japanese at the end of World War II, there has been no significant international threat from East Asian countries. All those happened were mostly contained within single country or at most two or more countries in a small region. We must also note that there were hardly any large- scale religion-oriented wars in East Asia. That was the background of those successfully integrated Vietnamese Chinese people in Europe.

However, the newcomers to the European Union today are very different from those old refuge seekers, because they would like to reserve their own religious belief, to insist it, to defend it, to widespread it, to mobilize more and more people to fight for it and fight against the “pagans”. That’s why belief-oriented violence can be a threat from both outside and within the Europe, and the conflicts between religious believes or even only differences of lifestyles could lead to conflict or even lethal violence.

Unfortunately, in the face of such a tsunami of immigrants, policy-making process has been rendered into a situation that could be considered irrational. Local people’s voice from bottom would not be heard from the top. Representatives of the nations and representatives of the peoples, once they were elected to the position, might never represent the best benefit of the whole nations and the whole peoples when they were in the process of decision-making. There exists potential gap between the strings of their thinking of those representatives and that of those who are represented. Decision-makers will look into human rights of those who are in trouble, but are willing to sacrifice those who are not, because they say that who are not in trouble should help those who are in trouble. They do not fully understand why those who are in trouble are in trouble, and why those who are not in trouble are not in trouble. Sometimes, trouble, for example, in the Middle East, was man-made. It does not exclude Western leaders or simply politicians who were involved in the trouble-making process based on misinformation. Politicians are not at all lawyers, historians, soldiers, educators and managers. They are elites only in the sense they always maximize their group interests in getting a long historical record in their roles. Professional politicians have their own strings of independent consideration concerning the world-views. Voters would be moved more by some political slogans than by systematic preaching.

Or else, most of the wars in the Middle East have not really been civil wars as they might be habitually called, and as the Western politicians might have had a consensus on pushing the so-called democratization of societies all over the globe. Publicized reports repeatedly pointed out

that there was the existence of elements of outside support from both the West and the adjacent countries of those Middle East countries, which have been making the situation there more than ever complicated. Therefore, might the European leaders plus the USA leaders have already expected that potential humanitarian situation would be inevitable and must be contained by the Europe itself? Then the decision-making process might be intentionally avoided to be known to the nations and the peoples. The best knowledge and the wisest conscience tell nations and peoples these reports that formed the foundation for support and intervention might lack of evidence.

However, at the trans-national level, decision-making and demand of the peoples could hardly be combined with each other. Therefore, the containment of tendency towards appealing to violence and uncontrollable immigration has never been a demanding task for any authorities to complete. There is a lack of ready-made, sufficient, effective, and universally accepted risk management mechanism in immigration policy. The current practice is informal, which is also the case in many other fields of international security, and in other fields of social control.

It turned out that among those people flowing in and out, were people who would potentially tend to appeal to violence. The problem is not that it is unknown whether there are people potentially tending to appeal to violence and how to control those immigrants moving in. The problem is that, even though it is already known that there are surely people tending to appeal to violence among them, law enforcement does not have information on the fact that who those potential people are. They are not informed. But why all of them failed in getting correct information in an early stage? As it was reported in a research published that 70 percent of those who claimed to be underage applicants for refuge were in fact older than 18 years old, based on examination of their teeth (FTimes, 2016). Besides misinformation, non-information is another serious problem. These people had nothing to be proved except that they claimed that had their own religious belief that could not be infringed nor changed. The West must respect their religious belief but the Westerners' religious belief will not be respected by them in exchange. In Western countries, new places of worship must be constructed, because those existing places of worship have been where the hostility exists. Therefore, in the past, at present and in the future, it is a hard work to integrate immigrant from those countries that were once stable and prosperous but with a different political system and the Western politicians tried to democratize their previous political system. They lost their old home, but will they have a new home that can accommodate them for long? Finally, without their correct background information, is it still possible to re-establish their identity? It is not strange that up to 2500 refuge-seekers disappeared from Finnish reception centres in past 18 months, and there is a possibility that there are presently people in the country whose identities have not been substantiated by authorities, and their ambition is unknown (Yle Uutiset, 2016).

Traditional studies and research in the field of international security has been located in the social control system of pre-information society, and deeply affected by cold war mentality. One of the old logic was that enemy's enemies are your friends. The politicians thought that, refugees must be victims of those autocratic regimes, while the Western nations were fighting against their repressive regimes; those refugees must have been or must become the friends of the Western nations. Therefore, although the end of cold war roughly coincided with the emerging of the networked information society, we can still see that practice and research in international security have mostly been lagging behind. The methodology in understanding contemporary international security must be brushed up. Of course, not only most researchers but also most stakeholders have in fact been in the similar position. That's why there is hardly a coordinated action plan in the face of common terrorist threats.

In sum, before potential threats, authorities have only irrational, informal and uninformed countermeasures as measured with three criteria, i.e. rationality, formality and informality, which can be used to evaluate how a social control system will play its roles in different ways.

Following this introduction, the article will precede to present features of contemporary international security, reasoning for the necessity for methodological renovation. The article then makes efforts to construct models of social control in information society based on Weberian ideal models of social control system, as renovated by Li (2006). The article turns to analyze contemporary challenges posed by information society to international security. By applying the ideal models into the interpretation, the article will consider informed formal rationality as an ultimate solution. The article gives some innovative topics for research in the domain of international security in near future. The last section will conclude the whole article.

Constructing social order models of information society

In classical way, according to Max Weber, there are only two indicators in considering social control, one is rationality, and the other is formality. Each of these two indicators has two extremes. These two indicators can form at least four different idealised types: rational formality, irrational formality, rational informality, and irrational informality (Weber, 1978 (1922); Milovanovic, 1994), as demonstrated in Figure 1.

While these types have been learned, criticised or developed, they were not clearly combined with the nature of information society. The Weber's models can be updated to provide a new explanation of the social control system in information society. Weber's models can well be put into a 2-Dimensional coordinate system. For the purpose of analysis, a third indicator, informality can be added, which also has two extremes, informality and uninformativity. Then Weber's model can be built up into a 3-Dimensional coordinate system (Li, 2015). In this

system, there are eight possible ideal models of social control. Used here are my brief descriptions of these models (ibid, pp. 8-18):

(1) Informed formal rationality, which is a representative of formal rationality with the subjects being informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated under the circumstances where clearly-addressed and clearly-observed rules were applied to every similar case in a coherent form. Similarly situated were similarly treated, without external interference with the decision-making process. Likewise, the decision-making process has a higher degree of transparency by ensuring that the subjects are informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as unified criterion, due process, and transparent operation.




Figure 1. Classical Weber Model in Pre-Information Society

(2) Uninformed formal rationality, which is a representative of formal rationality without the subjects being informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated under the circumstances where clearly addressed and observed rules were applied to every similar case in a consistent form. Similarly situated were similarly treated, without external interference with the decision-making process. However, the decision-making process had a relatively low degree of transparency and the subjects were not informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as unified criterion, due process, and opaque operation.

(3) Informed formal irrationality, which is a representative of formal irrationality with the subjects informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated in the process where it was uncertain whether clearly addressed and observed rules were applied to all similar cases in a consistent form. Similarly situated were differently treated, with some mysteriously arranged mechanisms functioning in the decision-making process. Arguably, the decision-making

process has a certain degree of transparency by providing opportunities for the subjects to be informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as diversified criterion, due process, and transparent operation.

(4) Uninformed formal irrationality, which is a representative of formal irrationality without the subjects informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated in the process when it was uncertain whether clearly addressed and observed rules were applied to all like cases in a consistent form. Similarly situated were differently treated, with some mysteriously arranged mechanisms functioning in the decision-making process. The decision-making process was absolutely secret through depriving any degree of transparency by denying opportunities for the subjects to be informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as unified criterion, due process, and opaque operation.

(5) Informed substantive rationality, which is a representative of substantive rationality with the subjects informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated under the circumstances where clearly addressed and observed rules were applied to cases according to the detailed situation. Similarly situated were differently treated, with severe external interference with the decision-making process. Besides, the decision-making process has a certain degree of transparency by providing opportunities for the subjects to be informed of the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as diversified criterion, random process, and transparent operation.

(6) Uninformed substantive rationality, which is a representative of substantive rationality without the subjects informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated under the circumstances where clearly addressed and observed rules were applied to cases according to the detailed situation. Similarly situated were differently treated, with severe external interference with the decision-making process. Furthermore, the decision-making process has no transparency due to denying opportunities for the subjects to be informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as diversified criterion, random process, and opaque operation.

(7) Informed substantive irrationality, which is a representative of substantive irrationality with the subjects informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated in the process when detailed situation determined the decision. Similarly situated were differently treated, with severe external interference with the decision-making process. Ironically, the decision-making process has a certain degree of transparency by providing opportunities for the subjects to be informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as diversified criterion, random process, and transparent operation.




Figure 2. Updated Weber Model in Information Society

(8) Uninformed substantive irrationality, which is a representative of substantive irrationality without the subjects informed. Under this ideal model, the social control system was operated in the process when detailed situation determined the decision. Similarly situated were differently treated, with severe external interference with the decision-making process. Furthermore, the decision-making process has no transparency due to denying opportunities for the subjects to be informed about the applicable rules and/or processes. Consequently, this model could be trichotomized as diversified criterion, random process, and opaque operation.

In the past, the social control system sank under the surface drawn between the informed and the uninformed. That is to say, it was located in a certain point within the contour constituted by the points of Uninformability-Informality-Irrationality-Formality-Rationality. Today, the ideal model is to be raised to the level of being informed. Thus we are talking primarily about the informed form of formal (or informal) rationality (or irrationality), located within the contour constituted by the points of Informability-Informality-Irrationality-Formality-Rationality. That is the upper part of the coordinate system, which is floating above the surface when information systems are acquiring pervasive usage.

This 3-D social control system may provide broad interpretive power in many disciplines in social sciences, including international security. In fact, I initially created this system in research of non-traditional security in cyberspace. This is an important basis for developing future study and can be applied to traditional security as well.

Recognizing contemporary challenges to international security with regards to informability

Increasingly relied on availability and accessibility of information, decision-making on security issues at the international level changed the territory of both theory and practice. Deep addiction to traditional thinking inevitably leads to destructive results in dealing with international affairs.

Today's international security must be reconsidered with reference to the new context of information age. Of course, information age is not only characterized by pervasion of information systems, but also full of fresh invention, innovation, transformation and reformation. The world and the society have been both changed, either driven by the advent of information systems, or coincided with it.

The first impact of information society on international security, from informed rationality point of view, was the marginalization of traditional security. Because of democratization and transparency, threats were transited to a new phase, in a more sophisticated form, and to a more covert status. Some of the changes were attractive topics in today's world stage. For example, perceived insecurity between giant pairs as that between Russia and the US, between China and the US, between China and Russia, between all these powers and EU; perceived insecurity between regional giants and small states in geopolitics, as that between occupant and the occupied state, Russian and Estonia, between superpower and the blocked state, the US and Cuba, between regional power and puppet government, China and North Korea. Relationship among all these pairs was changing. Currently, US-Cuba is becoming cooperative after decades of hostility. China-North Korea is almost divorced, in the brink of war. Estonia is independent and transferred from an old union (the former USSR) to a new union (the EU). All of these detailed situations should be clearly investigated and defined separately.

The second impact could be seen in observing collective security. Collective security has generally been of psychological value. The expectation of collective security lies more in deterrence than in defence. Collective security may at the same time means insecurity in certain field, such as elimination of inside border control. The EU is a good example of integration of security resources in support of maintaining collective security. If individual members of the EU are like 28 strings, naturally the rope formed by 28 strings will be stronger than any of the single string. However, in fact, these 28 members cannot simply form a union as a rope composed of 28 strings; inside this geographical, political, social, and economic union, full of vulnerable domains due to oversupply of information and likewise undersupply of information. Mutual trust and mutual reliance could increase the demand for exchange of information in certain fields, nevertheless could decrease the demand for exchange of information in other fields at the same time. In those fields with information oversupplied, the channel for information flow could be clogged, and the significance of such information could also be neglected. In those fields with information undersupplied, even though the channel for information flow could be unimpeded, such information could be more easily neglected. Information asymmetry leads to unbalanced security, like that in a rope formed by 28 strings with different lengths and different tensions. Such a rope can be stronger than some strings, but can also be possible to become more vulnerable for some strings. We can say that collective security is not always secure, but sometimes can be insecure. The insecurity can well be taking place within the structure of the collective security.

The third impact could be found with regards to human security. Human security was more exposed due to transborder free movements, network pervasion, and self-exposition in social media. A significant example is social networking services (SNSs). Pervasive application of the SNSs has been transforming modern social lives, from which traditional social activities have been extending their existing boundary into cyberspace. Billions of users of the SNSs grasp more and more fresh chances for communicating and cooperating, at the same time they are also confronted with new risks and dangers, possibly they could also be victimized with their life, health, freedom, and property. The SNSs, in front of both conventional and unconventional offenders, have induced concerns on unlawful access to accounts, disclosure and infringement of privacy, as well as misuse and abuse of anonymity. Many vulnerable points of the SNSs in protecting privacy accumulate and structure a hazardous atmosphere where privacy is left defenceless. On the grounds that there is more sensitive information, such as demographic and identity information, financial and consumption information, and clues and traces to daily activities and movements, it is uncomplicated for possible malefactors to select possible victims of varieties of security breaches (Dong & Li, 2016).

Finally, we must also consider comparative insecurity. In front of the high technology, old techniques become more and more insecure. But how to facilitate the adoption of the new technology, there are insufficient efforts being made and insufficient progress being achieved. Compared with security facilitated by new technology, traditional fields of insecurity can be perceived more easily by different stakeholders and players. If such new technology is adopted by some players, but not adopted by other players, original security immediately becomes insecurity. In contemporary world, some of the most important technologies are accepted with a slow step. For example, blockchain technology and bitcoin are far from being adopted officially by any government. This created a situation with unbalanced degree of security between those who adopted and those who did not adopt.

We can consider that, threats are always private and individual, while security is always public and collective. Traditional security can be seen as weapon against weapon, collective security is collective weapon against threats, human security is the ultimate target, and comparative insecurity is always a threat that we can never reduce.

Eliminating uninformed informal irrationality?

The process of developing a better decision-making mechanism can be formulated as the movement from uninformed substantive irrationality, where diversified criterion, random process, and opaque operation were accepted, to informed formal rationality, where unified criterion, due process, and transparent operation were prevailing.

Now we can say that there is a successful example in the world, Canada. Canada is a large country with small population. Canada has an immigration scheme to attract more people to live and work there. Those who are going to be a permanent resident in Canada, must undergo a process of background check. The application for a permanent resident status in gave us a lot of thinking about how well a country can manage those who are coming to the country. Those people must have enough money, enough education, and clear security history, all of which in fact form a relative stern basis for them to be integrated into the society and for security to be consolidated.

Refugees are not so much different, of course. People in difficulty should be helped by people in better society. But people in better society must first consider, whether those who tend to appeal to violence are among those refuge seekers. Necessary information is a must. International policy should not appeal to emotion, as in the case of immigration risk. Appeal to emotion is a fallacy in logics, but has widely used in international policy, usually leading to unexpected disaster. However, being over addicted to the role as a saviour for those people in humanitarian crisis might just blur the lines between the legal and the illegal, and the lines between the secure and the insecure. Over protection of those who are in danger and in uninformed situation might on the other hand unbalance the protection of those who are in safety and in informed situation. The result of this reversed decision-making renders no better-off for those regions already in crisis and leads those region in peace to worse-off. There are always controversies in emphasizing humanitarian protection of refugee seekers while neglecting welfare of local residents. During the process, informability plays a critical role in balancing these necessary benefits.

The current problem in Europe is that the authority accepted millions of refugees without sufficient information on their background. German government admits it cannot account for 600,000 of its 1.1 million asylum seekers – and many could be using multiple identities to travel across Europe (Tonkin 2016). According to German Interior Ministry spokesman Harald Neymanns, there are three possibilities that caused such a situation: delays in the processing of asylum seeker applications; refugees leaving Germany for a different country elsewhere in the EU; and even the refugees not existing, because some asylum seekers have been found to apply multiple times in an attempt to get sent to the city of their choice (ibid.). Apparently, there are not sufficient instruments to guarantee the justified flow-in and flow-out of people. So this mechanism can be concluded to operate in an uninformed status. In dealing with refuge problems, the European information society has been rolling back to pre-information society.

Comparatively, the US may have been aware of the potential threats posed by inflow refuge seekers. A research by the Homeland Security Committee preliminarily concluded that Islamist terrorists are determined to infiltrate refugee flows to enter the West - and appear to already have done so in Europe (Homeland Security Committee, 2015, pp. 2). They Europe's open borders are a "cause célèbre" for jihadist; European governments face substantial obstacles to information-

sharing and are stymied by a lack of internal border checks in their efforts to keep track of terrorist suspects; Glaring security gaps along refugee routes into Europe -especially lax security screening of travellers - make the pathway highly susceptible to terrorist exploitation; Mediterranean and Balkan countries risk becoming a new “terrorist turnpike” into the West due to particularly poor information sharing and weak vetting systems; Syrian refugee populations in Europe have already been directly targeted by extremists for recruitment, and in the long run certain communities in which they resettle are likely to become “fertile soil” for violent radicalization; America’s security is put at risk when partner countries fail to conduct adequate counterterrorism checks on refugees and are unable to cope with the radicalization challenges created by mass migration (Homeland Security Committee, 2015, pp. 6-9).

However, if we are talking about a coordinated “global crisis management mechanism” based on informability, it can be said that there are some soft crisis response mechanisms hosted by the United Nations. Their effectiveness is still due to review. The UN is operated under an umbrella of formal rationality, with the potentiality of the highest degree of informability. But the UN’s action is usually rendered the softest status, because it has frequently been witnessed an incapability in forming a consensus for taking effective action in maintaining “common” collective security, and frequently bypassed by stronger entities such as the NATO, or sometimes by the USA-led coalition, such as in cases of War in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Iraq War (2003-2011). These actions were partly taken when there was not sufficient information on which most correct decision can be made between informal and formal irrationality, with the potentiality of a lower level of informability. Unfortunately, even though the UN is an ideal, the USA or the NATO is a reality.

Still, mechanism in response to terrorism is one thing, while mechanism in response to threats brought about by other activities, such as large-scale immigration, is another. Today, the EU’s role in tackling immigration crisis can still be seen as playing with a soft mechanism. Similarly, it is operated more like an informal irrational mechanism, with a lower level of informability. Although until today, there has not been an occasion for the EU to demonstrate its role in mutual defence as a collective security entity, it can be expected that it will act in a manner as soft as the UN, unless there is the element of overlapping decision-making by the NATO, military decision-makers of which can be more informed than politician decision-makers.

Information society is an inevitable artefact of our time. Getting informed is a process for international security to be re-established, such as Estonians re-established the national identity in the 1990s. Estonian President Ilves recalled that, in 1991, when Gorbachev withdrew the Soviets from Estonia, state wealth was appropriated, “What does Estonia have?” as the President asked himself, it’s hi-tech. Mathematicians contributed a lot. That’s why Estonia developed information system and got computerized very fast (Keen, 2016). The most innovative example, e-residency, for which Donald Trump, the presumptive nominee of the Republican Party for

President of the United States in the 2016 election, has applied and been granted, is the first ever offer of “a transnational digital identity available to anyone in the world interested in administering a location-independent business online. e-Residency additionally enables secure and convenient digital services that facilitate credibility and trust online.” (E-Estonia 2016)

To get informed in the information society, copes with our methodological development of social control theory. It can also be extended to the theory and practice of international security.




Figure 3. Uninformed Substantive Informality

However, international security cannot be generalized as results from scientific experiments. But a rush generalization exists. Rush generalization is another logic fallacy. A recent example is the Western interference with Syrian was. The starting point of such interference is that: democracy is better than autocracy in the West, Assad regime is not democratic, so if they change this regime to democracy, it will be better. But it must be considered, whether there will be 500,000 deaths under Assad regime, plus a million refugees, some of them already determined to appeal to violence already in Europe?

Inspiration for future research

The pervasion of information systems provides broad potentialities for research in the field of international security. Emerging topics can be identified and formal informed rationality ideal model can be applied as a criterion of test for various solutions.

One is international financial security, which is more than ever being threatened. But there are a few inventions to safeguard the financial system, for example, blockchain-based bitcoin. Blockchain is a model of cryptography technique. And bitcoin is a kind of cryptographic money. It is not a scam. It is about high technology. Now an Estonian start-up “Funderbeam” launches a marketplace for start-up investments Hankewitz, 2016. Blockchain will be used to secure

investments in the online trade. With the start-up of the business, it's our good time to follow up in our research. Paradoxically, it requires us to determine whether bitcoin can be attributed as a currency or only a payment method, because no official authorization has ever been made to approve such a "currency", and bitcoin itself might bear no legitimate value at all. A real currency must be approved by law, by a government, but not by technicians not by scientists, even though science and technology might play an important role in decision-making process by adding the weight of informability. But it need some time, sometimes a long time to transform new knowledge and new techniques into politics, particularly when it concerns with change of some internationally recognized mechanisms. However, it is possible that bitcoin can be taken as one of the digitalized payment methods, which are not mutually exclusive and which have their own advantages.

Another one is exploitation of the internet by people who tend to appeal to violence. A UN study has identified six sometimes overlapping categories of means that can use the Internet for terrorist purposes: propaganda (including recruitment, radicalization and incitement to terrorism); financing; training; planning (including through secret communication and open-source information); execution; and cyberattack (UNODC, 2012, pp. 3-12). Apparently, groups that tend to appeal to violence may use the Internet in broader and more substantial ways as to recruit new members, to learn terrorist methods, as well as to acquire counterintelligence information (ibid. pp. 12-13). Many ladies and men, for example, from European countries were now with people tending to appeal to violence in the Middle East. The problem is how to find a moderate way to monitor and interfere with the networks. The excuse of human rights, or simply, the excuse of freedom of information, should not be an obstacle to hinder limited and critical intervention with the information networks, because absolute freedom of some means absolute non-freedom of others. Every individual and every state must balance between privacy and security, if absolute privacy of one person will lead to insecurity of others.

Yet there is another one, for example, some of the security aspects of the foreign policy of the European Union, particularly in the field of immigration. Missing of informability leads to weakness of control system in combating illegal immigration, in which the existence of potential factors tending to appeal to violence has been kept unknown or neglected. In fact, the concept of European Union itself might leave informability missing in internal movement of persons due to the freedom enjoyed by each Union citizen. Because there is no internal border control, free movement of citizens becomes free movement of any persons, including legal foreigner residents, and illegal immigrants with the help of the Schengen visa. That is problematic for those illegal immigrants to move freely from here to there in most of the 28 countries.

All these topics deserve priority in our research, using our new methodology and new techniques. Certainly, many other potential topics can also be similarly identified and explored, and studied with the criterion that fits informed formal rationality.

Conclusion

After being renovated, the Weberian model of social control, adding informality to formal rationality and forming a three-dimensional coordinate system, could lead to a new mind in thinking about international control in the information age, to which the background of contemporary international security transited from pre-information society. Based on informability, contemporary international security is confronted with multiple challenges, to which ideal models of informed formal rationality can provide explanatory solutions.

While informed formal rationality might be posed as an ideal mode of social control system, the process of developing a better decision-making mechanism can be formulated as the movement from uninformed substantive irrationality, where diversified criterion, random process, and opaque operation were accepted, to informed formal rationality, where unified criterion, due process, and transparent operation were prevailing.

Being inspired by new technological achievements, financial security has the potentiality to be assisted, for example, by blockchain-based bitcoin. However, at the same time, the Internet can also be exploited by people who tend to appeal to violence so as to improve devastating effect of their activities. There must be more countermeasures against such exploitation. Informability is also very important in relieve the growing difficulties in dealing with immigration. Such research will be more fruitful with new methods and new techniques.

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