Significance Of Leader Idiosyncratic Factors As Negotiates In Conflict Resolution Process – A Case Study Of Jusuf Kalla On The Peace Agreement In Aceh

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Abstract
This paper analyzes the idiosyncratic role of a leader as a negotiator in a conflict resolution process. The conflict studied was between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The research uses qualitative methods by prioritizing story-telling techniques from informants. The Aceh conflict involving the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been ongoing since 1976 and ended in 2005 with the signing of the Helsinki Agreement mediated by Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland. He heads the non-profit Crisis Management Initiative. The Indonesian government had attempted to resolve the conflict before Jusuf Kalla led the peace negotiation team from the Indonesian side. However, a different approach from the previous leader was deadlocked. The results show that Jusuf Kalla's success as a negotiator in resolving this conflict is influenced by the idiosyncratic factor of Jusuf Kalla, who is a multi-talented person, namely politicians, traders and born from Bugis ethnicity, which makes it easier for him to have good diplomacy with political leaders and warlords from the Free Aceh Movement as well as with a peace mediator, namely the Crisis Management Initiative.

Keyword: idiosyncratic, conflict resolution, negotiation, diplomacy

1. Introduction
The world order is formed by war and peace as two processes that interact. Conflicts of interest and rivalry become the basic configuration of conflicts and wars in every millennium, which has also contributed to shaping civilization for centuries. War and peace are destined to be a pair that are related to each other like a knot when peace is the final product and consequence of war, which in the practical logic of international relations, forms new state actors since the Westphalia
Treaty of 1648 until the 1990s decade after the end of the Cold War (1947–1991). This can be seen from the historical-empirical fact that every time there are peace negotiations ending a long war, a number of new nation-states will be born.

It can be said that war and peace collectively gave birth to the birth of a nation-state. The Westphalian Accords ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe, resulting in the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a new sovereign nation-state. The Vienna Peace Congress in 1815 ended a long period of the Coalition War, or the Napoleonic Wars, which gave birth to several new countries in Europe, such as Greece in 1821, Belgium in 1830, and Latin American countries which gained independence at almost the same time. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which became the culmination of the end of the First World War, also changed the world map with the birth of new countries such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Ireland in 1918, along with Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Turkey, which became Republics. Then, the San Francisco Agreement, apart from the end of the Second World War, also had a hand in forming a lot of new nation-states in the world, especially in parts of Asia, including Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and new countries in Africa. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War for six decades has also brought 15 new countries from the Soviet Union, the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and six separate countries inherited from the Yugoslav Federation. The same era marked the unification of West Germany and East Germany.

In the context of the interaction of war and peace in a country that in many cases has an ethnonational character and even a socio-cultural identity, the historical-empirical perspective has also shown that these two things have contributed to forming a nation-state—related to the formation of India and Pakistan in 1947, which in the following 25 years their conflictual interactions, also contributed to the construction of the State of Bangladesh in 1971.

In a similar context, it can also be seen that the establishment of the separate State of Timor Leste as the 27th province of Indonesia, South Sudan, which apart from the Republic of Sudan and Kosovo, is the latest dynamics of friction that occurred in the former Yugoslav Federation, which previously produced Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia.

More or less the same phenomenon, although with different achievements also occurred in Catalonia some time ago, which wanted to separate from Spain, Scotland, which still had aspirations to separate from Great Britain, the issue of Kurdistan in four regions spread across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and the Kashmir region which includes India, Pakistan, and China.

International relations, including conflict resolution and peace negotiations, is the fruit of the perception of the relevant stakeholders, especially the decision-makers and designers who ensure the final word and the decision at the end and end of a dispute. In this case, the leader and
leadership factors can be determined as independent variables for the end and destiny of a conflict or war. In other words, the perception and personality of the leader and leadership will determine the rhythm and rhythm of the decisions taken, leading to a critical policy on whether a conflict and war are continued or ended, why they must be continued or ended, how to end them, and so on.

Concerning the perception and personality of the leader and leadership, it will be possible to explain matters concerning psychological factors, personality traits, and matters related to values and sociological factors and understand the sensitivities of leaders and leadership.

Leaders and leadership also cannot be separated from style, sensitivity, understanding, and intuition, which in turn will affect perceptions, perspectives, and perspectives that lead to the ability to calculate and predict how to get the best final results while also winning hopes and interests in a practical, effective, and efficient manner.

These are the things that Edwin Hollander put forward as factors or idiosyncratic theories that, in many cases, will be decisive for policymaking, especially when faced with critical times, including efforts to end long-lasting conflicts and wars and seek peace steps as a means of achieving an optimal result.

2. Problem
To end a protracted conflict and war, both on a low scale (low intensity) to a massive level, decision-making and determining policy directions towards peace is not an easy and straightforward matter. Conflict resolution and peace that become the magnum opus of a leader and leadership will be influenced by external and internal factors. Conflict resolution and stages of peace which include peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building, of course, require certainty and measurable calculations so that efforts to end conflicts can be understood by those involved before, in turn, entering into efforts to harmonize perceptions with the highest expectations is an agreement.

The alignment of perceptions becomes the most challenging part when the two disputing parties do not yet have a collective understanding; this is related to the initial calculations and the sensitivity of the leaders between the parties concerned. In this case, the perception of the leader and leadership as mentioned in the background section is determined by several related factors such as psychological conditions, sociological background, historical factors, personality, sensitivity which will be the coefficients for the formation of calculations related to the negotiation and negotiation process. The factors both internal and external that become influential variables include:
First, internal factors include communication with elements and actors in the political structure which in this case is related to efforts to form the same perception, dynamics and level of public
support, including the media as a factor outside the political and government structure, as well as related national conditions. With the stability of security and order, including the economic aspects of the people in it; second, external factors, among others, can be explained as various things related to the dynamics that occur both at the regional and global levels as one of the variables that directly or indirectly influence the dynamics of the domestic situation. These external factors also include the perceptions and opinions of the international community, both among state actors and non-state actors and international organizations.

In aligning perceptions, idiosyncratic factors will appear and have relative determination towards the direction of the process towards peace-making as the initial phase of achieving a comprehensive peace process. However, in many cases, idiosyncratic factors are not the only factors that will lead to a positive direction for the sustainability of the comprehensive peace process to reach the peace-building phase as a stage to restore everyday situations and conditions as they were before the conflict. In any case, idiosyncratic factors related to the individual and the leader figure and leadership style will require both complementary and supplementary conditions.

Related conditions will refer to a number of things, namely
1. the ability and sensitivity to take advantage of momentum;
2. the sense and intention to take advantage of reading and understanding the situation;
3. the ability and sensitivity in understanding the problem, mainly related to the root, background and motive of the problem which in some cases is also related to historical, sociological and also anthropological perspectives;
4. sensibility in cultivating empathy which is the psychological basis for understanding social and psychological situations and conditions for those who feel the impact of conflict; and
5. the ability and sensitivity in performing calculations in order to create a win-win and dignified design of negotiations and resolutions for all conflict parties, particularly in relation to the response to physiological and psychological needs for the substance and material resulting from negotiations and agreements.

Especially for the fifth factor, although this factor is not the most important, this factor will bring about effective and efficient negotiations and agreements in order to prevent the possibility of dissatisfaction from each or one of the parties considering the material and substance of the negotiations as a determinant variable for achieving a peaceful peace comprehensive.

Concerning the interdependence character of idiosyncratic factors with several other approaches, the figure of a leader and his leadership style must be adaptive and accommodating to these five things. The first two factors are related to the momentum that a leading figure should understand as a buying-time mechanism as a conductor for achieving a commitment to harmonize and 'force'
perceptions on all parties involved and interested. The first and second factors are also related to efforts to form a collective political will for the significance of peace negotiations or negotiations. Meanwhile, the third and fourth factors are the stages or processes of materializing the substance of the problem, which will produce a mapping process of the entire spectrum of conflict dynamics as a whole from the beginning to the actual conditions. The third and fourth factors become physiological and psychological modalities for idiosyncratic factors and influence variables that strengthen the first and second factors.

To explain more clearly and in detail in this topic, an empirical and theoretical discussion will be presented related to several cases that occurred in Indonesia, especially in Aceh and Papua as two conflict and peace laboratories which will be compared comparatively with several cases that occurred in several countries, including in the Philippines (Mindanao), Thailand (Pattani), Sri Lanka (Sinhala-Tamil conflict), South Africa (Apartheid Regime Government—the succession of leadership under Nelson Mandela). Comparison with several cases with similarity and dissimilarity is expected to produce a comprehensive comparative perspective that can explain the influence of idiosyncratic factors followed by several other approaches, namely: Ripeness Moment Theory and Relative Deprivation which are seen as convergent to portray issues around conflict resolution and peace.

There are at least three things that are the objectives of this paper, namely: first, to conduct a comprehensive study of idiosyncrasy as a personal factor of a figure or leader figure in taking crucial steps and decisions related to efforts to solve the crisis; second, measuring the magnitude of the idiosyncratic factor as one of the most critical links in conflict resolution efforts, and; third, to elaborate on the character of M. Jusuf Kalla as a national leader regarding his roles and initiatives in the conflict resolution process, as well as the realization of peace which is comparatively aligned with several similar cases at the international level.

3. Literature Review
Related to related themes, this section reviews several conceptions and understandings, namely: first, the notion of antagonism as one of the fundamental foundations in reviewing the substance of conflict and the dynamics of its resolution; second, the idiosyncratic factor as the primary substance of the discussion in this paper; third, ripeness moment as a conducting factor as well as a variable that complements idiosyncratic factors, as well as efforts to explore relative deprivation in conflict resolution efforts, and; fourth, relative deprivation as a material condition for proactive conflict resolution efforts related to policy implementation, and at the same time as an essential element in the manifestation of idiosyncratic factors. These four things become the main topics of discussion to provide an analytical description of the idiosyncratic factors as the focus of this paper.
3.1. Conflict Resolution in International Relations Studies
There are three primary schools of thought in contemporary International Relations studies that examine the causes of conflict: Realism, Liberalism, and what has come to be called Constructivism. These approaches offer a different perspective on the forces that drive state behavior, the sources of conflict, and the conditions that create peace and stability.

The Realist approach sees the international system as fundamentally driven by the question of power. States find themselves in an anarchic environment where there is no higher authority they can appeal to if their interests are threatened. As a result, all states must be susceptible to the distribution of power, particularly military power, in the international system and act accordingly – increasing their power where possible and maintaining a balance of power if necessary. Leaders, the Realists argue, must not forget this fundamental reality. They must not fall prey to the illusion that international law, world public opinion, shared ideological goals, or the good intentions of other leaders can compensate for lack of power or an unfavorable distribution of power in the international system (Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1979; Carr, 1948). From a Realist perspective, conflict is endemic in the international system and can never be completely ruled out. War can only be avoided when power distribution is stable and the status quo is maintained. Realists differ among themselves as to when such a stable constellation of power relations is likely to emerge. However, it is possible to distill three general sets of stability conditions from the literature that most Realists would agree.

First, the distribution of capabilities in the international system needs to be in line with the status of the various system actors. A major war is likely to break out when the great powers choose to go against the existing order – as France did under Napoleon or Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II and later Hitler. Why a great power should choose to oppose the international order is a matter of debate. However, in general, a Realist would argue that because the distribution of power resources has shifted - or is shifting - in such a way that the leaders in that country feel they can, or are should seek to improve the power position of his nation (Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1989).

Second, conflict is more likely to occur when major players in the international system miscalculate actual power relations. On the other hand, clear and accurate information about actors' intentions and capabilities enhance stability. The First World War is often cited as an example where fatal miscalculations, especially on the German side, resulted in significant fires in general (Jervis, 1976).

Third and finally, wars tend to be petty when military technology and geostrategic situations favor defense rather than attack. When the opposite is accurate, and the offense is preferred over defense, leaders are under tremendous pressure to attack first, especially in crises (Jervis, 1976). In this connection, Realists often see nuclear weapons as stabilizing the international system.
because they make the possible costs of any conflict between nuclear powers seem far greater than the possible gains from war (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1998).

In contrast, liberals have a more hospitable view of the international system than Realists (Moravschik, 1997; Kegley, 1995; Baldwin, 1993; Doyle, 1997). In general, Liberals argue that the state pursues a variety of different goals, the most important of which is security. Some of these interests can cause countries to conflict, but others lead them to cooperate. The main issue is whether the benefits of cooperation outweigh the potential benefits of conflict. At specific points in time, the structure of the international system may favor cooperation; at other times, it may support conflict (Oye, 1986).

From a Liberal perspective, conflict in the international system is thus not endemic to the system, the pace of Realism. The international system can change in ways that make war in general less likely than before. Many liberals argue that such a transformation is today driven by at least three fundamental trends (Rosecrane, 1986; Daudney and Ikenberry, 1999).

The first is a general increase in international trade and economic interdependence, which allows countries to benefit more from each other's cooperation and, at the same time, increases the costs of conflict. In the past, states have often had to resort to subjugation or threats of violence to secure access to the technology and raw materials needed to achieve wealth and security. Currently, almost all countries can rely on the world market.

Second, one by-product of growing economic interdependence is the emergence of several international norms, rules, and institutions designed to regulate and coordinate cooperation between countries (Keohane and Nye, 1977). While initially, such institutions may be the product of certain constellations of power – for example, Anglo-American hegemony on world markets after the end of the Second World War – they live their own lives and dynamics as states become increasingly dependent on them achieve their national goals. Over time, these institutions can even change the way international actors define their interests. As international organizations increasingly take over governmental functions, they can even cause changes in the identities of actors in the international system, replacing rival nation-states with more cooperative and peaceful (if not conflict-free) transnational orders. Meanwhile, international institutions reduce the possibility of conflict by increasing the flow of information between countries, establishing rules and mechanisms that allow collective monitoring and possible sanctions on state behavior, and providing regular forums for leaders where they can meet and coordinate on policies (Keohane, 1984).

Finally, many Liberal international relations analysts emphasize the impact of international institutions on state behavior and attach great importance to the role domestic institutions play. Certain types of political systems are thought to be more likely to use violence than others, while other types are more likely to try to resolve their differences peacefully. In particular, democratic regimes are widely viewed as inclined to avoid military conflict with one another. A wealth of
evidence has been accumulated (and debated) to support the proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other.

While each of the forthcoming Liberal claims can be treated as a separate set of arguments combined, they make a solid and persuasive case for the view that a transformation of the international system is taking place. Increasing economic and technological developments lead to growth in trade and economic interdependence. This interdependence, in turn, triggers increased political and social interactions between states and created strong incentives for political leaders to create international institutions to manage these flows between states. Over time, this international systemic trend has supported the re-establishment of domestic norms and institutions in a more pacific direction – namely, the spread of democracy.

The Constructivist approach to studying international relations differs from Realism and Liberalism in several respects. Constructivists hold views of human behavior, including state action, as fundamentally shaped by socially shared understandings of the world, both in terms of how the world is and how it should be. The essence of this understanding is the identity of the actor and the interests of the actor. This understanding - which can be called culture, mentality, or discourse - is not merely a subjective reflection of objective material reality but arises from communicative and social processes, socialization, debate, and sometimes coercion. The material-structural world, including features such as the balance of military power or opportunities for international cooperation, is thus mediated by specific cognitive lenses bestowed upon actors. As Alexander Wendt put it, 'anarchy is what states make. In the interest of theoretical equivalence, one can make the same point regarding complex interdependencies.

One implication of this viewpoint is that social scientists who wish to investigate the causes of state action or evaluate prospects for conflict or cooperation in the international system cannot rely on generalizations drawn from other cultures or particular temporal contexts. The same set of objective structural conditions predisposed Europeans to conflict in the late nineteenth century may not have done so in the early twenty-first century, precisely because European society had been transformed by the destructive damage of the two world wars and European leaders were eager to do so. Draw lessons from past mistakes. Similarly, the Western experience can serve as a guide as to how East Asian societies can respond to a similar set of circumstances only to the extent that it can be demonstrated that they share a common conception of national interests and a similar understanding of how the international system operates.

Instead of relying on some tricky generalizations, it is incumbent upon analysts of interstate relations working within the constructivist paradigm to investigate how actors in the international system perceive their interests and environment how these conceptions are then translated into concrete defenses—furthermore, foreign policy choices and how their actions interact to shape actual foreign policy outcomes. Sometimes, a constellation of actors' identities and interests may favor peace and cooperation. Other times, they may like conflict. Each of these three approaches – Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism – arguably captures a different aspect of the
international system. At the same time, as with all theories in the social sciences, each approach also leads analysts to ignore other factors that may be important. Exclusive reliance on one or another approach to analyzing the natural world leads to a vague perception of the dynamics at play. More comprehensive efforts to analyze interstate affairs should view these approaches as complementary, not mutually exclusive.

3.2. Antagonism Factor

The discussion will present the understanding, conception, definition, and application of several factors and related approaches, followed by an empirical description of several cases that occurred. The focus of the discussion will be on efforts and the peace process that occurred in Indonesia (Aceh and Papua) by touching on the leading figure and initiative of M. Jusuf Kalla as one of the masterminds of the success of the peace agreement in Helsinki and the complexity of the problems that occurred in Papua. Ideally, the process and dynamics of problems that occur in Indonesia feel more complete when compared with similar cases in neighboring ASEAN member countries in particular. Meanwhile, comparative cases in other parts of the region are expected to explain better the contribution and role of idiosyncratic factors from the involvement of leaders in pursuing conflict resolution and a comprehensive peace process.

Beginning the discussion section can be started with the conception of the dynamics of the conflict. In this case, there will always be four factors that explain a conflict, namely: motive, trigger (trigger), instigator, and antagonism. Of the four factors, antagonism is the most significant factor determining the characteristics of a conflict which has implications for the level of difficulty related to efforts and the resolution process. A conflict will be faced with a higher dynamics of complexity if there is an antagonism factor which in many cases is related to the symbols of primordialism and the identity of a group which can be in the form of ethnicity, socio-cultural background, and even religion or belief. If assembled as a conception and definition, the symbol of primordialism will consist of a configuration of history, territory, identity, and community. In many cases, primordialism and identity as an instrument of dichotomy often appear with different degrees or degrees. A conflict will be more challenging to resolve if there is an increasingly concentrated primordialism, mainly related to identity, a combination of ethnicity and religion.

However, this primordial attachment and connection do not quickly and immediately become a modality for creating a perception of hatred against one group or community towards another, except having to experience what Milton Esman calls in 'Ethnic Politics' as an 'ethnic politicization process' and also religion. Benedict Anderson, in his work 'Imagined Community,' also provides an understanding of the concept of community, an imaginary project of a group of people to create an identity that is different from others through the exploration of socio-cultural instruments.
Antagonism in conflict cases is also a vehicle for mobilizing processes and efforts to attack parties seen as opponents or enemies who have different ideational factors, such as socio-cultural backgrounds, religion, even history, ideology, and other related matters. Antagonism is also closer to the identification and physical justification of groups in society based on ethnicity, like their identity. In the case of Indonesia, the 1965 incident might be understood as an empirical fact of antagonism to parties who get the label 'left' whose stigma is attached to this day. In the case of Aceh, it is similar but different; during the Darul Islam period, Daud Beureuh had a relative dissimilarity with the Free Aceh Movement under Hasan Tiro. However, the antagonism was relatively similar in the second period because the identity of 'Acehan' with the greatness of Samudera Pasai was often exploited to distinguish it from 'Javanese-Indonesian' as colonial rulers who exploited Aceh in all aspects of life. At two different times, what happened in Aceh also happened in Papua and has an even stronger antagonism given the extreme differences between Melanesian Papua and Malay Javanese-Indonesian. It must also be admitted that the factor that complicates efforts to resolve the conflict in Papua is the inability of all relevant parties to address issues related to antagonism, which is much stronger than Aceh, which has relatively many similarities and homogeneity with Java and ethnic groups in western Indonesia. Including issues of religion and cultural families. The antagonism factor at least is often used as a tool for mobilization as is the case in Mindanao – the Moro Muslim minority has taken up arms since 1912 against the Catholic majority; in Thailand, where the Malay Muslim minority took up arms against the identical Thai-Buddhist government since the early 20th century. A bloody conflict for nearly five decades between the Buddhist majority Sinhalese and the Tamil Hindu minority stems from the issue of banning the use of the Tamil language. Antagonism was also identified during the resistance of anti-apartheid groups in South Africa, the Civil War in Lebanon involving Sunni, Shia, and Christian groups, the Irish Conflict which raised Catholic and Protestant identities in the realm of conflictual interactions, and even a major rivalry in the Middle East involving Iran which Persian, Jewish Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Arab and Turkish Egypt.

In some cases, interdependent idiosyncratic factors can respond by neutralizing the intensity of antagonism in conflict resolution efforts. The figure of M. Jusuf Kalla presents a character who can explore idiosyncratic factors in resolving the Aceh conflict. M. Jusuf Kalla's sensitivity and ability to read the situation became a decisive step to blunt the strong antagonism among sympathizers and figures of the Free Aceh Movement. Empirically, M. Jusuf Kalla's efforts to deal with this antagonism were realized in a strategy to bring in government representatives from non-Javanese and non-military circles, which the SBY-M preceded. Jusuf Kalla government's policy to replace the 'militant nationalist figure' in the elements of the military leadership. The peace process between the Government of the Philippines under Fidel Ramos and the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) under Nur Misuari is also inseparable from the character of Fidel Ramos, a military figure with a civilian character and strong commitment to democracy. Equally important is that Fidel Ramos is the leader of the Philippines, a Catholic country, which
is Protestant. Psychologically, this creates a belief among MNLF circles that, in fact, ‘Catholicism is not a fixed price,’ in addition to the characteristics of Fidel Ramos, who is known to be sympathetic, humble, and free from political intrigue and conflicts of interest.

3.3. Idiosyncratic Or Idiosyncratic Factors

Idiosyncratic factors become an essential link in international relations, especially those related to perceptions, mentality, personality, and characteristics of leaders in influencing policies and decisions of state actors. Theoretically, idiosyncrasy can be interpreted simply as a combination of positive things from a leader in making decisions influenced by talent, experience, background, values held, or beliefs. In a more detailed sense, Warren defines idiosyncrasy as the overall mental arrangement of a person, including character, intellect, temperament, moral attitudes, and attitudes built from the life journey of a leader or decision-maker. In another sense, Coulumbis and Wolfe state that idiosyncrasy is a variable that influences policies related to perceptions, images, and personal characteristics of the leader or decision-maker.

As the essential link in the effort to ultimately end a prolonged conflict or war, the idiosyncratic factor will also be very influential and a determinant in conflict resolution policies and peace negotiations. Practically, the idiosyncratic factor becomes the determining variable for subsequent situations and conditions related to the dynamics and sustainability of a conflict or war. Nelson Mandela's modest, reconciliatory, calm, and calm temperament also played a significant role in building harmony and peace in South Africa during the transition period after the end of the apartheid government. Mandela's character, however, helped to defuse the situation so that polemics and the possibility of political revolt from white groups did not occur. Likewise, Kim Dae Jung was an inclusive and democratic figure who, in the end, was able to bring harmony to the dynamics of domestic politics after the era of military rule in South Korea. Kim Dae Jung's humble demeanor ultimately played a role in ending the crisis that occurred between pro-democracy forces and the supporters of the status quo, which in fact were the military, so that it finally succeeded in bringing about a shift and a relatively non-violent transitional period.

Likewise with the figure of M. Jusuf Kalla, who has played a large role and stake in a number of peace processes in Indonesia, starting from Malino 1 and 2 and the Helsinki Agreement. In the eyes of the international public, the success of the peace talks in Helsinki, which ended three decades of armed friction between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia, has become a special note and has placed Indonesia as a model in conflict resolution and efforts to build regional peace. This success has made Indonesia a place of reference for other countries afflicted by prolonged internal conflicts to ask questions and share experiences. According to records, no less than envoys from the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and even Nigeria have been sent to meet with M. Jusuf Kalla regarding the success in dealing with the conflict. As is
well known, these countries also experience domestic conflicts with ethnonational nuances and even carry religious issues in them.

However, the success in ending SARA nuanced conflicts in Maluku and Poso, which Aceh followed, has defined the personality factor in M. Jusuf Kalla's leadership as a positive and constructive reason for this.

The experience of M. Jusuf Kalla, who has a business background, equipped with experience as an activist, politician, minister, and statesman, has provided personal sensitivity and capability in dealing with conflict resolution issues. During the preparation of the negotiation agreement with the Free Aceh Movement, perhaps no one thought about how the Indonesian government finally sent representatives from non-Javanese and non-military circles, Hamid Awaludin and Farid Hussein, both sons of Bugis-Makassarese, to stand—leading the way in negotiations. It was also not possible at that time to install General Endriartono Soeharto as the head of the Army who later became the highest leader in the TNI structure, replacing General Ryamizard Ryacudu, whose 'nationalist-conservative' background was seen as an inhibiting factor for the opening of communication channels with GAM officials in Sweden in particular. –Hasan Tiro, Zaini Abdullah, and Malik Mahmud- before the start of the series of negotiations mediated by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, under the banner of the Crisis Management Initiative.

The idiosyncratic factor that becomes the explanatory instrument behind a policy success cannot stand alone without being equipped with the foresight of a leader or leadership in considering situational factors based on approaches outside the individual side of the leader. The approaches that are considered relevant in equipping a leader or leadership sensitivity and foresight are related to the momentum and substantive needs that exist in the dynamics of conflict-related to aspirations, demands, hopes, and desires based on historical perspectives, economic prosperity, and identities that are based on historical perspectives. Refers to socio-cultural aspects. There is an adage that conflicts and wars in the world occur because of arrogance and ignorance. This is related to the absence of sensitivity and sensibility to acknowledge history, arrogance, and indifference in viewing and acknowledging differences in identity, arrogance, and indifference in seeing suffering, inequality, and inequality, as well as arrogance in seeing the power structure as a tool or vehicle to win oneself and defeat others.

The influence of a leader's sensitivity and foresight in seeing situational factors and momentum also plays a significant role in strengthening his idiosyncratic factors. One of the substances that are often explored to create socio-political change is democracy which in many cases becomes the initial platform for creating agents of change and the occurrence of change itself. As a trend in global interactions, democracy seems to have found a comfortable habitat after the Cold War. Fukuyama's work with the 'End of History, Last man Standing' puts democracy as an excuse to change the face of the world with all its dynamics. Several empirical facts that explain that
democracy has finally become a factor of change, including conflict resolution efforts, were in the Philippines when power was transferred to President Corazon Aquino. President Cory Aquino implemented democratization in the Philippines, one of the implications of which was an open political policy to start open communication and negotiations with the Moro group (MNLF), which led to the signing of peace within the framework of the formation of the ARMM (Autonomous Region for Moro-Mindanao) in 1996. This is an idiosyncratic factor on the figure of Fidel Ramos (formerly Minister of Defense in the Cabinet of President Corazon Aquino), who can read trends and is sensitive and observant in reading material and non-material needs related to how to end the conflict with the Moro minority who are Muslim in the south of the country (Maguindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi). Similar foresight and sensitivity are also found in the idiosyncratic factors possessed by the figures of Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae Jung. They can carry and translate the momentum of time in global trends and the psychological gap factor to take the opportunity to make changes in South Africa and South Korea that occurred in the early decades after the end of the Cold War.

Success in resolving conflicts and creating peace does not necessarily have domino implications for similar things in Papua, which has its roots in 1963 when Fritz Awom and Lodewi decided to oppose the integration of West Papua into Indonesia after the Trikora Campaign. The results of the popular opinion poll at the end of 1969 are still reaping polemics and controversy when some elements which support the independence of West Papua consider that the popular consultation process contains elements of engineering and fraud. On the other hand, on various occasions, the Indonesian government has always emphasized the Ius Possidetis Deris principle as a valid legal stipulation on Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua since the 1960s. In early 2001, the government enacted a special autonomy package policy (Otsus) to reduce aspirations for self-determination, which many viewed as appeasement, thus proving inefficient enough to end conflicts that had already formed a protracted or intractable character.

It is interesting to observe related to the idiosyncratic factor, which is highly anticipated as wisdom that is believed to open the door for comprehensive conflict resolution efforts. In general, the democratization conditions since 1998 have been able to become a guide for the possibility of various soft-approach-based mechanisms.

The national leadership from that time up to SBY-M. Jusuf Kalla, SBY-Boediono and Jokowi-M. Jusuf Kalla still does not seem to have a powerful spell to open the door for implementing the peace negotiation process. Despite the many differences in characteristics between Aceh and West Papua, in substance, there is a relative similarity between the two. Until now, the idiosyncratic factors have not yet emerged among national leaders, including the cold hand of M. Jusuf Kalla, who succeeded in leading Ambon, Poso, and Aceh to peaceful conditions. It is also interesting to observe M. Jusuf Kalla's perception of the problems that occur in Papua, which materially and in substance, the root of the problem has appeared on the surface and is often
raised by several academics and observers who are at least in four basic things which can also be positioned at the same time as relative deprivation, namely:

First, re-opening a historical perspective by remaining based on international legal references to prevent political elements from being distorted by parties who are in favor of Papuan independence;

Second, the issue surrounding the recognition of socio-cultural identity through the policy of 'integrating Indigenous Papuans' into Indonesia with serious efforts to build the image and perception that Papua is Melanesian Indonesia, and Indonesia is Melanesian Papua, not only Malay with its sub-culture. So far, the perception that often arises is that Indonesia only wants to 'integrate' the Papua region, not Papuans, especially those with Indigenous status. This second factor becomes essential because it is related to the inherent strong antagonism and primordialism related to the Papua-Indonesia/Java dichotomy, mainly concerning physiological and psychological aspects;

Third, the issue surrounding the government's policy on the sustainability of the Freeport Mc Moran mine has a socio-economic-environmental impact on Papua. However, the Freeport issue has become an ancestral domain related to prosperity or economic equality and equity, which until now still seems to have not materialized, and;

Fourth, the special autonomy status, which has been believed to be effective, is still seen by many as only a little effort and policy to reduce conflict, not resolve conflicts. Ideally, the implementation of special autonomy projects should also touch on issues related to community empowerment and regional development, one of which is to improve the quality of human life the quality of human resources through the formulation of policies to provide educational facilities, including higher education, to all study programs, especially those based on expertise for indigenous Papuan sons who have intelligent and intellectual abilities.

3.4. Ripeness Moment
This theory was put forward by William Zartmann, which is often a reference for the start of negotiations and negotiations to end conflicts. In other words, Zartmann interprets Ripeness Moment as a condition that brings the parties in a conflict to enter into negotiations or negotiations. There are two requirements contained in the implementation of the ripeness moment, namely: first, both parties feel unable to defeat each other (stalemates) and lead to a mutually unfavorable situation as well as the perception that the conflict will end in incalculable losses, and; second, the actual condition of the conflict will lead to a much worse situation or in other words that the conflict will lead to a situation when both parties have a balance (stalemate) which at a certain point will not be able to determine the loser and the winner.
In its application, Ripeness does require the sensitivity and foresight of a decision maker in seeing and taking advantage of the momentum that is seen as supportive and accommodating to problem-solving efforts. Therefore, Ripeness will be supplementary with idiosyncratic factors when the vision of a decision-maker must be careful about the dynamics of time and momentum so that it will make it easier for a leader to make decisions effectively and efficiently. In other words, the ripeness moment is one of the idiosyncratic factor variables, especially when it is associated with conflict resolution and peace.

In the previous review on the discussion about the substance of idiosyncrasy, it has been stated that democracy factors also determine as well as entry gates for settlement and resolution efforts in several countries such as South Africa, South Korea, and the Philippines, in addition to several other variables in the idiosyncratic factors of a leader. And decision-makers. In the case of conflict resolution in Indonesia, the democratization factor should be categorized as one of the ripeness factors by referring to the change in policy direction and approach taken by the Government of Indonesia in dealing with the problem of separatism in Aceh and Papua.

Democratization as ripeness has undeniably been a conductor for the softening of the Indonesian government to initiate talks with elements of GAM and OPM and even provide limited concessions related to demands from the separatists. The voice of the military, which has traditionally been very conservative and militant against any attempts to approach dialogue, has finally been reduced along with changes in the rhythm of political policies that are more open, inclusive, and responsive to regional aspirations. However, the situation of openness after 1998 is not a determining factor as ripeness if we look at the fact that democratization has also strengthened the demands of separatism regarding the option of a referendum on the right to self-determination—the leadership of SBY-M. Jusuf Kalla, who is sensitive and observant to the dynamics of changing times, is likely to encounter obstacles still if he only uses openness and democracy as instruments of ripeness.

When referring to the factual situation that occurred at that time, the tsunami disaster was the moment of ripeness which, on the one hand, became a reinforcing factor for changes in government policies. The tsunami disaster, which destroyed and devastated almost all coastal areas in northern and eastern Sumatra, especially Aceh, has changed the direction of Aceh’s conflict forever. Faced with difficulties in the disaster mitigation process, both parties – GAM and the Government of Indonesia – 'speak' in the name of humanity. Under these conditions, it was finally identified that both parties had reached a point where they would not be able to beat each other from a political perspective (stalemate). In this context, the tsunami can be seen as a 'blessing' so that it creates ripeness which in turn forces the two parties to sit together so that a peace agreement is reached. In this case, M. Jusuf Kalla's position was indeed correct; especially his initiative indirectly led the disaster mitigation process since the early days after the tsunami that killed more than 200 thousand people from North Aceh to Aceh Jaya and Aceh Singkil,
where countless victims were from the families of sympathizers and GAM militia as well as TNI and Polri soldiers and their families.

M. Jusuf Kalla's careful reading of the situation can be interpreted as an initial modality for peace negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government. It is unavoidable that apart from the idiosyncratic factors of the national leadership that gave birth to policies that are open, inclusive, and dialogical, the natural factor of the tsunami has become a reinforcing component of the idiosyncratic factors so that conflict resolution and the achievement of peace find their way in Aceh.

In contrast to the achievement of peace in Aceh, the Government of Sri Lanka was unable, or willing, to use the tsunami disaster as a ripeness to open negotiations with the separatist Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE/ Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam). Sri Lanka, which was also hit by the tsunami because of its geographical position in the Indian Ocean, should take advantage of this factor as a ripeness moment. However, in the end, the Sri Lankan Government under President Mahinda Rajapaksa decided to use military determination to end the more than 40 years of Tamil Tiger resistance led by Vellupillai Prabhakaran. In general calculations, the ripeness for the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka is more on physical factors related to the implementation of the government's repressive policies by using the following momentum:

1. The defection of the Tamil Tiger warlord, Colonel Karuna, to the Sri Lankan Government resulted in the disclosure of many of the military secrets of the Tamil Tigers
2. The involvement of the Israeli Shin Beth and Pakistani intelligence elements in efforts to deal with the conflict militarily
3. The determination of the Tamil Tigers as an international terrorist group followed by freezing of the group's financial assets in various countries, including the United States and Western Europe

Returning to the situation in Indonesia in Papua, in contrast to what happened in Aceh, the Indonesian government has not yet been able to end the separatist Free Papua that has been going on since after the 1963 Trikora. Various policy formulations and approaches have been used since the Soeharto era until the last SBY-Boediono in various policy variations that never yielded results. The idiosyncratic factors during the post-1998 political reform leadership period from the era of President Abdurrahman Wahid to Joko Widodo also did not show positive signals for conflict resolution efforts. Without comparing the personalities of each national leadership figure, Gus Dur's idiosyncratic style with a leadership style that is 'relaxed,' open, and inclusive did not make the escalation of conflict in Papua subside. In several respects, the Indonesian government has been relatively successful in 'breaking' the diplomacy of the OPM separatist parties in international fora, particularly among the South Pacific countries, both in the Melanesian Spearhead Group forum and at the Pacific Island Forum.
Compared with the achievements in Aceh, it can be seen that there is a relative possibility that ultimately affects the failure of government policies in solving the problem of separatism in Papua. The relative possibilities referred to are:
first, a ripeness moment is needed, which in this case is not interpreted as something similar to a tsunami;
secondly, the Indonesian government still seems to be 'trial and error' regarding the implementation of several policy packages aimed at responding to the problem of separatism, including the implementation of special autonomy and large-scale infrastructure development, especially in the era of President Joko Widodo, which has not resolved the Papua conflict. Moreover, more felt for the empowerment of local communities and regional development in all its potential;
third, the 'inconsistency' and absurdity of policies in dealing with the Freeport issue as a relative deprivation for OAP (Indigenous Papuans), especially the Amungme, Komoro, and Dani indigenous peoples;
fourth, lack of sensitivity in exploring sociological and anthropological factors which lead to questions about Papuan identity,
and; fifth, internal problems among the Papuan community itself, including conflicts between factions within the OPM;
Sixth, the role of M. Jusuf Kalla in the SBY administration compared to when he was with Joko Widodo, is relatively different. When paired with SBY, both have a division of tasks that is strengthened in a political contract that allows M. Jusuf Kalla to play a role without exceeding the limits of his authority as stipulated in the constitution. This division of roles did not exist in the Jokowi-M. Jusuf Kalla era, so the idiosyncratic M. Jusuf Kalla practically did not have room to move towards resolving the Papuan conflict.

Thus, the idiosyncratic factor of the national leadership that is a solution to the problems in Papua should ideally be able to touch and interact with it, particularly regarding the ability to identify ripeness moments. Among these factors, the second, third and fourth factors will relate to the relative deprivation approach as an influential variable in idiosyncrasy along with the ripeness moment. In the discussion that follows, the substance of the relative deprivation approach will be thoroughly discussed as one of the main substances that will further explain the idiosyncratic factor of a leader and his leadership style in seeking peace.

### 3.5. Relative Deprivation
The initial concept of deprivation is based on the individual's psychological condition when the gap or discrepancy limits the value expectations (values expectations) and value capacities (values capacities). Values are events or occurrences, objects, or conditions that individuals and groups fight for in society, which may include the value of welfare, power, and interpersonal values. In more detail, Runciman understands that relative deprivation is a psychological and emotional-based situation narrative when a person does not have X. In contrast, another person...
has X, so he also wants to have X, and feels worthy and able to have X. There are two kinds: The types of relative deprivation are: first, Egoistical Deprivation if someone feels they have a worse condition than other people in a group, and; second, Fraternal Deprivation when someone assesses the condition of his group as worse than other groups in the broader setting.

Chowning Davis defines relative deprivation as the perception of a difference between expectations and desires in a psychological approach. In other words, according to Ted Gurr in 'Why Men Rebel?' and 'Minority at Risk,' relative deprivation can be understood as a psychological state when a person feels dissatisfied with the subjective gaps or shortcomings he feels when he is in his self or group situation compared to other people who are in turn will lead to perceptions of injustice. Thus, after several definitions, there are at least four significant premises: inequality, expectations, perceptions, and injustice. As one of the influential variables in seeing the strength of the idiosyncratic factor in conflict resolution and efforts to create peace, an ideal leader must also have sensitivity and foresight in understanding the relative deprivation approach as one of the supplementary variables for idiosyncrasy. In this context, the foresight and sensitivity of a leader or decision-maker to the deprivation content that exists in a conflict or war against all parties involved will determine the quality and idiosyncratic capacity so that peace as a primary goal will be won.

As has been explicitly mentioned in the previous section, in conflicts, especially those with a communal and ethnonational character, deprivation will always be an essential material and substance because it is related to the pragmatic interests of existing groups, especially related to policies that are accommodative and responsive to the needs of those who perceive themselves as victims. The sensitivity and foresight in an idiosyncratic framework can be interpreted as empathy and sympathy for the perception of suffering and loss suffered by a specific group, especially for minority groups who experience coercive policies and repression from mainstream or majority groups.

The ability of a leader to provide empathy will accommodate perceptions of possible response designs that will be given to materials and substances related to deprivation or loss that exist in a society. Sensitivity and foresight to the deprivation factor will guide a leader's calculations in preparing peace negotiation materials and preparing an exit strategy if peace negotiations end deadlocked. Understanding and sensitivity to deprivation factors will also reinforce ripeness as one of the main factors influencing idiosyncrasy. In the case that occurred in Indonesia, during the Bung Karno government, rebellions occurred triggered by the inconsistency of the central government's policies towards policies to accommodate the aspirations of local people.

It must be admitted that separatist-laden rebellions were ultimately resolved with military preference, as happened in Aceh, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Banyumas Residency, and West Java with its Darul Islam, in some parts of Sumatra with PRRI and Permesta North.
Sulawesi. At that time, the impression that the leadership was not too calculated with the deprivation factor that existed among the regions that took up arms and an approach that was more psychological, sociological, and anthropological. The Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh under Daud Beureuh was evident in its identity in the deprivation frame because it rejected the central government's policy of making Aceh a residency-level region under North Sumatra.

This condition is exacerbated by the reluctance of the central government to accommodate needs related to local identities, such as the implementation of sharia as a symbol of socio-cultural identity and local history. During the resistance phase of the New Order government, the motives and relative deprivation of the Free Aceh Movement were more visible in the demands around economic and distribution issues as the main menu of resistance to the central government. However, the substance-related to local socio-cultural identity did not disappear during Darul Islam. Responding to the emergence of deprivation with a political-economic nuance, the characteristics of M. Jusuf Kalla, who has a business background, were very significant and contributed to the agreement with the Free Aceh Movement. The combination of character in idiosyncrasy and sensitivity to deprivation has succeeded in creating perceptions that are contained in calculations and negotiation materials prior to the SBY-M. Jusuf Kalla administration, the government seemed to be exploring the substance of identity, including the implementation of sharia, which proved far from hot. It is undeniable that the idiosyncratic factor of M. Jusuf Kalla as an entrepreneur is more sensitive to the deprivation factor surrounding the material demands for the distribution of economic, political, and government distribution which has proven to be effective efficient.

As a comparison with the cases that occurred in the Philippines and Thailand, it appears that decision-makers do not have enough political will to consider the relative deprivation factor as a material that must be answered when trying to solve the problem of separatism in the southern region, which has different socio-cultural, historical and cultural identities. Sociological. It is similar, but not the same that the conflict issues in Southern Thailand (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat) and in the Southern Philippines (Mindanao) are more related to the issue of ethnonationalism when socio-cultural identity becomes the motive and the new primary cluster is followed by practical substances related to it. With the issue of economic backwardness. At least the content or material related to the implementation of sharia law, the local education system with an Islamic pattern, and the local language are often exploited in the debate around the resolution mechanism, in addition to the issue of political distribution and power.

4. Discussion: The Relevance of the Three Approaches
The interaction pattern between idiosyncratic factors as a focus with antagonism, ripeness moment, and relative deprivation can be presented, which also affect idiosyncrasy. This image is expected to provide an initial narrative for discussing idiosyncratic factors, which will be discussed in more detail in the further discussion section. Of the three major approaches that
have been briefly presented, there is a complementary process of interaction between idiosyncratic as the basis for leader and leadership characteristics with two thoughts as well as variables that influence it, namely, ripeness moment and relative deprivation, when analyzing idiosyncratic factors in a leadership style in solving problems—a protracted conflict. As a talent or innate factor that is also influenced by various journeys and life experiences, the idiosyncratic factor of a leader in applying ideas, initiatives, and creativity still requires external factors as influencing variables. Things that are considered supplementary variables that will further sharpen the sensitivity and foresight of a leader are related to how he can translate momentum and cultivate empathy in the form of policies taken.

The resolution of the Aceh conflict as a model can, of course, be explained by the idiosyncrasy of an M. Jusuf Kalla, who can carefully read the momentum and upload empathy related to the formulation of the negotiating material. The case of the disengagement of Timor Leste must also be understood as a lack of ability to read the momentum and understand the relative deprivation that affects the leadership responsible for the 'failed integration project' of East Timor. These things show that the idiosyncratic factor is not the only independent variable in the case of resolving a conflict and creating peace. In other words, it can be concluded that idiosyncratic factors are more related to ideas and initiatives, two related supporting variables, namely ripeness related to the momentum or time when the idea or initiative is expressed, and relative deprivation related to sensitivity and empathy for the substance and materials needed to resolve conflicts, including things needed in times of crisis.

It can be stated temporarily that M. Jusuf Kalla's major work in Aceh is still being awaited regarding efforts to end the problems in Papua with dignity, which in this case will include three basic problems, namely: first, the ripeness factor that is closest to being able to 'disturb' has not been identified.

Idiosyncratic national leadership; two, there is no understanding and agreement on the substance of relative deprivation as a material that will encourage national leadership ideas and initiatives; and; third, the idiosyncratic factor of the national leader who has not been responsive and is not willing to take risks when faced with the reality of the complexity of the existing problems. The work of Jusuf Kalla in Aceh, Poso, and Ambon through the Malino meeting is still felt to be waiting for the momentum to reap similar achievements in Papua. Nevertheless, Indonesia still needs and may have someone other than M. Jusuf Kalla who will optimize his idiosyncratic personal factors in creating peace in other places and regions.

5. Conclusion

Based on the analysis's data using the idiosyncratic theory, the researchers have the following conclusions. The success of the conflict resolution process between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement is determined by many factors and is complex. However, 2 essential factors strongly support the realization of a peace agreement that ended the 29-year conflict. First, the devastating tsunami that hit the Aceh region on December
26, 2004, with a magnitude of 9.3 on the Richter scale, the tsunami devastated parts of Aceh, 167,000 people died, 500,000 people lost their homes, and turned off the wheels of the Acehnese economy, including Free Aceh Movement. The tsunami caused the resistance strength of the Free Aceh Movement to decrease considerably; they were unable to continue the armed conflict properly. Second, the change in the negotiation strategy chosen by the Indonesian government, from a very militaristic and uncompromising approach that is zero-sum-game to a compromise and prioritizes a win-win solution.

The change in the Indonesian government's strategy in negotiating with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative cannot be separated from the role of Jusuf Kalla, whom President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed as the head of the negotiator team. Jusuf Kalla changed the negotiation strategy to the one mentioned above. The choice of a win-win-solution strategy is inseparable from the idiosyncratic factor of Jusuf Kalla, who borrows Rosenau's (1976) model, which is commonly used to analyze foreign policy decisions into negotiating decisions in conflict resolution. From the idiosyncratic concept or individual factors modeled by Mintz and De Rouen (2010), namely (1) Cognitive consistency, (2) Evoked set, (3) Emotions, (4) Images, (5) Belief systems and schema, (6) Analogies and learning, (7) Leaders' personality, and (8) Leadership style. It turns out that Jusuf Kalla's background as a trader/merchant dominantly influences the implementation of the five concepts above.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


