A Critical Analysis Of Afghanistan's Current Administration

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Abstract:
This study gives insight on the future prospects of regional politics since there are historical and ideological facts that can help comprehend regional politics in a circumstance where the Taliban recapture control in Kabul. The future of the area and Pakistan's relationship with Afghanistan will be determined by the power structure of the future Afghan government. The impact on surrounding nations and the region if the Taliban retake power on their own will be different, as will the implications if they return in a power-sharing format as demanded by Western powers. Pakistan and its regional partners must be prepared for both scenarios in order to effectively manage the situation.

Keywords: Taliban Government, Pakistan, India, China.
Introduction:

The US will depart Afghanistan in 2021, whether or not there is a settlement. Pakistan, Iran, India, China, Russia, and their neighbors will all be affected by this expansion. If the US withdraws without first reaching an agreement with Kabul, Afghanistan could devolve into civil conflict. In this event, Pakistan may be forced to assist the TTP in their hideaway, limiting the use of force against the TTP in order to save the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan civil war is not in the interests of regional players, with the exception that the US may use it to target Pakistan and Iran, as well as providing aid to India in its fight against Pakistan and China. Pakistan and other regional players are concerned that the Taliban's control of Afghanistan would lead to the formation of new coalitions in the region. The Taliban's return to Afghanistan might set off a cascade of local, regional, and international events that could last a decade or more. For more than two decades, the United States has amassed a wealth of information in the region; yet, selecting how and where to apply these lessons requires careful study. The situation in the region is, without a doubt, difficult. The exit of the United States could jeopardise the country's global security relations, particularly in the Middle East. The disorderly character of the leaving emphasizes the enormous cost of severing long-term ties. Pakistan's national security is threatened by India's presence and influence in Afghanistan. By putting a political blockade on Pakistan, the Pakistani military believes India is attempting to diminish Pakistan's position in global and regional affairs. As a result, since the Taliban's fall in 2001, Pakistan has done everything it can to obstruct India's presence and influence in Afghanistan (Yousaf, 2019). Ending Afghanistan's territorial claims beyond the Durand Line and gaining access to Central Asian economic markets and natural resources are two other Pakistani goals in Afghanistan that could be realized with China's help in the future. Should the Taliban retake power, this paper lays out alternative scenarios and policy options for regional players, particularly Pakistan. In the long run, such a situation is hazardous for Pakistan's interests. A multidimensional situation could arise following the Taliban's predicted invasion of Kabul (Karamat, Muzaffar, & Shah, 2019). With the world concerned about the Taliban's historical and ideological foundations, all regional and international players are waiting for the right moment to unveil their Afghanistan policy (Yaseen & Muzaffar, 2018). All regional players will have to change their plans for Afghanistan to accommodate an Afghan administration in Kabul, which might be all-Taliban or a coalition with a substantial Taliban participation. Pakistan's relations with the Taliban are "comfort women" and are based on strategic disagreements in Afghanistan. By assisting the Taliban, Pakistan forces Indians out of Kabul. To challenge US domination, the Taliban's goal in Afghanistan is to establish a base in Pakistan (M. S. Malik & Khan, 2018).

Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban:

Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban has its ups and downs, problems, and regional differences, in addition to this handy marriage. Islamabad refuses to use its enormous influence within the Taliban leadership to influence Taliban behavior or terminate the Taliban's ties to terrorism (Tariq & Marwat, 2015). Pakistan thinks the Taliban are a bunch of knuckleheads. The Taliban is enraged
at the Taliban's reluctance to move against the tens of thousands of Pakistani armed groups operating in eastern Afghanistan (Shah & Ayaz, 2015).

**Ashraf Ghani's Administration:**

To restore political and economic stability in Afghanistan, the Taliban may agree to a power-sharing agreement with Ashraf Ghani's government. If they refuse to cooperate in order to achieve the Taliban's ideological aims and insist on preserving full authority, the country may face a short- or long-term insurrection (Puri, 2017).

**The Taliban have returned to Kabul:**

Pakistani and regional players must be thoroughly prepared for the consequences of the Taliban's return to Kabul. In Afghanistan, the competing interests of Pakistan, Iran, India, China, the US, and Russia could lead to new regional alliances. The TTP is Pakistan's most powerful terrorist group, and it has openly professed support for the Afghan Taliban. The terrorism wave may have a direct impact on Pakistan (S. E. Hussain, 2010). The Afghan Taliban's domination has the potential to both empower the TTP and persuade Pakistan to abandon its anti-TTP measures.

**Pakistan's border with Afghanistan has become a source of contention:**

Pakistan has aided the Afghan Taliban in pursuing their strategic in-depth campaign against the wave of violence that has taken root in Afghan soil since the Taliban was created in 1996. Since the Taliban's fall in 2001, Afghanistan has been a thorn in Pakistan's side. Pakistan requires a pro-Pakistan administration to deal with the Durand Line and protect Pakistani territory from anti-Pakistan extremists operating on Afghan land. With strong theological ties to the Afghan Taliban, the TTP has become a major security issue in Pakistan, and the TTP leadership acknowledges the Ameer's efforts in Afghanistan (Omrani, 2009).

**India's Influence on the Taliban:**

Pakistan must reduce India's influence on the Taliban since the Taliban has close ideological ties to India's Deoband Madrassa. India can use the religious institutions and people of Deoband Madrasa to connect with the Taliban, harming Pakistani interests. Iran may approach the Taliban as an anti-American regional movement and offer its territory and resources to persuade them to change their ideas. In this scenario, the Taliban will have less clout in Pakistan and will be able to barter for more benefits for Pakistani terrorist groups. Pakistan will strive to satisfy the Afghan Taliban in this situation by enlisting foreign funding, recognising the new Afghan state, and striking a settlement with the TTP (S. Hussain & Latif, 2012). A agreement like this might harm Pakistan's security forces' reputation while also encouraging terrorist groups to reconstitute in the country.

**The Taliban's plan to compel American troops to leave quickly is as follows:**
The Taliban's goal of forcing the quick withdrawal of US soldiers may be realized, as the Kabul government's recklessness, incompetence, and corruption may aid them in seizing control of the city. President Ashraf Ghani and his associates might abandon the nation in this situation, causing government forces to become disoriented and handing the Taliban additional influence. By declaring an amnesty for the ruling class and the military, the Taliban leadership may assist keep the city peaceful? When US soldiers leave, Kabul's government institutions are highlighted as being weak, which might quickly collapse the city.

The Taliban can be pursued by China:

With a positive, realistic, and constructive attitude, China can track down the Taliban and urge the world community to drop its anti-Taliban bias (Javaid & Mushtaq, 2014). China believes it can cope with any Afghan government, including the Taliban, because of its long-standing actions in the region and its shifting attitude on regional politics. Unless they make a catastrophic error, the Taliban will profit from mistrust and support if these findings impact Chinese policy. Russia is another important player in this game. The Taliban kept its options open and continued to operate in Afghanistan even after conquering Kabul. Despite its long-standing ties with the Taliban, Russia, unlike many European administrations, has a soft place for them. The countries of Afghanistan and Russia share a boundary. Pakistan and China are the two countries most concerned about regional security and stability. China fearing that terrorist groups may develop a foothold in Afghanistan and expand to South and Central Asia, Russia and Pakistan have made dealing with the Taliban a key priority. Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to have recognized the Taliban even before Ashraf Ghani's administration collapsed, and it is willing to play a role in Kabul even if Ashraf Ghani's government remains in power. It can also request financial aid to aid in the withdrawal of foreign soldiers. Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan is unquestionably historical, as many commentators have pointed out, but its primary goals are security and political.

The US has decided to entirely withdraw its forces:

The Taliban's presence into Kabul appears to be dreams come true for international and local actors, including the Taliban, who have decided to withdraw all of their troops from Afghanistan. When the Taliban seize control of Kabul and their country, the international community will need new means to cope with the legitimacy of the Taliban administration in Kabul. The sovereign governments of member nations will make the decision on whether to grant or withhold recognition. Both the state and the government are theoretically eligible for recognition. In terms of the former, it should be emphasized that Afghanistan has long been recognized by numerous countries, including the UN Security Council's five permanent members. When Afghanistan's political power crumbles in 2021, more than one organization will be able to claim to represent Afghans; President Ashraf Ghani now has the status of a government representing Afghans. The Taliban, who control more than 60% of Afghanistan's land, may become the country's de facto ruler.
Key supporters of the Taliban:

In Kabul, Pakistan, China, and Russia will be the main Taliban supporters, and they will refuse to recognize the Taliban government until they see evidence that the Taliban are committed to forming a comprehensive government, insisting on international aspirations, distancing themselves from terrorist groups, and adopting incremental governance thinking. The Taliban's return to Kabul is seen by Pakistan as a sign of rising tensions with India. The Afghan government currently favors India, but a Taliban-led administration may improve relations with Pakistan (Z. U. abiden Malik et al., 2021). China and Russia have been enraged by the United States' supremacy in Afghanistan. Their mission is to fill the vacuum left by the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan (Nizamani, 2018). China is likewise keeping a close eye on Afghanistan's wealth. Acknowledging the Taliban government is a card that can be used to put more pressure on the Taliban government and demonstrate to the rest of the world that they are following the international community's goals and maintaining their pledges. China, Russia, and Pakistan can try to hold the card until the world community recognizes the Taliban's recognition. Because the Taliban leadership has not defined a restricted philosophy of Islamic administration, all countries, particularly neighboring states, are unsure about the Taliban leadership's international agenda.

The Afghan refugee influx:

Another issue for Pakistan is the influx of Afghan refugees, which could become more serious if Afghanistan devolves into civil war as a result of the US withdrawal. Although the US has an influence on Pakistan, this is not always the case, as Pakistan makes its own judgments when it sees fit. Pakistan is also concerned about European countries' efforts to keep the Taliban at bay (Borthakur, 2017). When it comes to assisting terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, on the other hand, has little faith in the Taliban. Pakistan has compelled the Taliban to disassociate itself from these organizations as a result of these worries. The Taliban has a wide range of interests in Pakistan, including ties to the terror group it battled for years in Afghanistan during the US-led war (Paing, 2016).

The Taliban's radicalism poses a significant threat to Pakistan:

Pakistan has a severe challenge from the Taliban's radicalization, which is concerned not just about the growing threat of terrorism, but also about the country's economic condition. Since 1996, a lot has changed. So far, the international community has been unconcerned about the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's domestic issues are currently being discussed by the international community. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in addition to Pakistan, were among the first countries to recognize the Taliban regime in 1996, albeit they were hesitant because to regional and internal worries about Doha.

The International Community Role:
The international community, including Pakistan, is pushing for an inclusive government because the Taliban will be unable to manage Afghanistan without it. It has the potential to incite civil war and obstruct economic development and international aid. Pakistan's and China's economic interests in Afghanistan may be jeopardized as a result of this circumstance (Akhtar et al., 2021). The Taliban regime has always attempted to obtain international credibility. Aside from quelling domestic discontent, the new administration will have to relinquish its hardline ideological stance, which the Taliban will find difficult to accept. Because the Wahhabi tradition is the foundation of the group's existence, it will perish if it is allowed to depart from it. A new faction will arise even if the Taliban takes a more liberal attitude. Comprehension the government's future policies, which include the Taliban's involvement, require an understanding of the Taliban's discourse along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Z. U. A. Malik, Zhilong, & Fatima, 2020). They pledged that once in power, they would restore peace and security in particular areas as well as enforce Sharia, or Islamic law.

**Conclusion:**

The situation in Afghanistan is rapidly changing, and practically all regional players, including Pakistan, are working on measures to deal with the situation that will emerge once US troops leave. Pakistan is a significant participant in the region and its neighbors. Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, and India are all concerned about the possibility of US army withdrawal and Taliban re-establishment in Kabul. The TTP and other terrorist groups may make it difficult for Pakistan to keep connections with the Taliban, who will never accept the use of force against the TTP, and may even encourage Pakistan to talk and enable their ideological ties to develop in Pakistan. Given the country's borders with Pakistan on one hand and China on the other, the return of the Taliban to Kabul in the form of a coalition or independent administration would raise India's concerns about the situation in Kashmir. In the 1990s, when Afghan foreign fighters poured into Kashmir to help the rebellion, India could repeat the mistake. To maintain control over the situation, India's borders have been significantly tightened in recent years. As a religious decree from Deoband (India) is tied to the Taliban, India can employ the Deoband Centre in India to control the Taliban's business.

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