Russia-Nato Relations Past, Present And Future

DR. FARES FALAH ALATTIN

Abstract

Nato's political and military comments on the security environment after the Cold War were primarily due diligence. In this period when predictability became difficult, process management, in which even "uncertainty" was perceived as a threat, was actually due to a lack of methodological paradigm in analysis and predictions. In other words, how to assess and detect threats was lost in the bureaucratic congestion of the Alliance. As a matter of fact, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus was on what was "opposed" rather than "who", and this approach was correct. Because even the types of conflicts that existed in the past were rapidly conceptualized with different interpretations of the new era and required to turn to facts rather than actors. Under these circumstances, NATO has tended to question traditionalism in military activism and to move towards new types of missions.

Nato's post-Cold War experience also coincided with its geographical expansion. In other words, while new threats and security situations shaped the Alliance's thinking world, the multi-edged threat plane required consideration of different problem areas at the same time. While areas of member states such as public safety are on the rise in the shadow of climate change, the concerns and perceptions of threats inherited from the Cold War period of the states accepted as members dictated the preservation of the level of war readiness in the traditional sense.

Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea and its attempt to seize Donbas from the inside confirmed the concerns. Thus, Russia has proven that it alone can challenge the United States or NATO. It turned out that countries with ethnic Russian populations or pro-Russian political leanings were particularly susceptible to Russian influence. Speaking after his meeting with US Secretary of State Blinken, Lavrov's use of the term "symmetrical zone" showed how Russia perceives not only NATO expansion but also its own expansionism with cold war logic. The current situation in Ukraine, on the other hand, should push NATO beyond the level of combat readiness and seek recriminalization, while Biden's talk of economic sanctions has called into question the cohesion between political and military determinations.

In this study, the development process of the relationship between the parties will be discussed and the factors affecting this process will be emphasized. Also, Russia's stances and reservations towards enlargement will be examined and NATO's It will be tried to determine how effective Russia is in its immediate surroundings. As a result, the possible future of the
relationship between the parties and Russia's involvement in NATO. The possibility of becoming a member will be discussed.

Keywords: NATO, Russia, ABD, Cold War

During the Cold War, NATO, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact led by perceives it as the most important threat to itself and its reason for existence is this. was threatening. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR After this period, NATO, which lost its most important reason for existence, together with Although it has based its existence on different reasons, there is a conflict between Russia and NATO. The mutual threat perception from the past continued for a long time. lately According to opinion polls conducted in Russia, the Russian people still support NATO. defines it as an aggressive military organization and considers NATO as a military organization for Russia. argues that it poses a threat. In this environment of distrust, the relations between the parties, especially In the 1990s, it remained rather superficial and no significant progress could be made. NATO, especially in the pre-enlargement periods, reacted to Russia's reaction. It has made some arrangements in favor of Russia in order to prevent it, but Arrangements such as the creation of the Permanent Joint Council in the 1990s has not been satisfactory. Russian domestic policy as well as NATO's approach The relationship between the parties was also decisive. During this period, in Russia In particular, the more dominant Eurasian tendencies have negative effects on NATO. has been an important factor in shaping a judgment.

What do Russia's changing internal policies mean for NATO?

The decision to suspend the activities of Russia's delegation to NATO and close the Alliance's offices in Moscow marks a marked deterioration in its relations with the West. But going a little deeper, it can be seen that such movements are more about internal policies than global policies, or at least reflect the concerns of an aging leadership to maintain its power within the country, as well as some of the processes that are happening in Russia.

Undoubtedly, sensitivities at home are the phenomenon that shapes all international relations, from the interests of the governing elite to the strengths of national economies, societies and forms of governance. They are also disproportionately dominated by the country's top leader, because public responsibility and attention often do not affect foreign policy much. Leaders who believe they are under threat can grow the perception of external problems to distract the public and justify the pressure they exert, while leaders who see their power and reputations in decline can seek a goal that suits them on international issues. All of these factors apply to modern Russia; this is of particular interest to NATO, which is trying to identify, identify and deter potential threats from the East.

Kremlin targeted by criticism

As the so-called 'Crimea Effect' has lost popularity in recent years, the regime in Russia appears to be losing its legitimacy. A sluggish economy in which wages cannot cope with rising prices, official corruption and the failure to properly manage the COVID-19 pandemic have undermined Support for President Putin, and, more surprisingly, the United Russia bloc, which represents the Kremlin in parliament. In the September elections, which came to the fore with
allegations of fraud in the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, some observers claimed that United Russia's vote was around 30%, not 49.82%, as recorded.

The weakening of public support coincides with the Kremlin's increasingly combative rhetoric at home and its adventurous attitude abroad. The fact that public support is steadily decreasing may have played an important role in the emergence of such behavior. Putin's old social contract, in which he promised to make continuous improvements in the quality of life of the Russian people if given political control, appears to have been broken. Instead of keeping its promises, the Kremlin chooses to portray the country as a country under threat, surrounded by enemies who are preventing it from taking its rightful place in the world and trying to shape Russia according to its own wishes. As a result, the Kremlin is emphasizing the message that Russians should put aside their own troubles and disagreements and support the regime for the benefit of their country.

Although this message is broadcast through the state's propaganda channels in a scratching manner, it does not seem to have succeeded much. While the Russian people cannot intensify their dissatisfaction at some point, they are not convinced that their country is under military threat – even the most hardened Russian leaders prefer to talk about a program that, in the words of Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, will 'destabilize the sociopolitical situation in the country, encourage and radicalize protests, and destroy the traditional moral and moral values of Russians'.

In addition, they have no desire to embark on an adventure in foreign countries – Crimea was a special occasion. Moscow has waged direct clashes with proxies in Ukraine's Donbas region in the early days of the syrian deployment. The Kremlin has receded on a proxy system that is easy to deny because it knows the political risks of endangering Russian troops.

**Gibridnaya voina**

While it is not known exactly what is happening in Putin's inner circle, Putin and his powerful allies such as Patrushev, Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Bureau, and Sergei Naryshkin, director of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau, truly believe that the West is a threat. The Kremlin's economic woes - from a slowing economy to the rapid rise of opposition leader Alexei Navalny - are attributed to both public and secret manipulation by the West. To them, hybrid warfare – gibridnaya voina – is something NATO uses against Russia, not the other way around.

Navalny's poisoning decision, for example, was probably based on navalny's belief that he was deliberately working for the West or becoming an unconscious pawn to weaken the Kremlin's hand. Likewise, the hybrid war campaign against NATO, which used all methods ranging from deliberately false news to corruption, aimed at dividing it, distracting it and demoralizing member states, aimed to break up an alliance that was an extremely powerful adversary for Moscow in every respect, as long as it maintained its integrity. Whether it's applauding to encourage Catalan separatists or supporting radicals on the left or right, Russia's goal is to destabilize NATO and neutralize it. From promoting ethnic divisions in the Balkans to supporting the regime in Venezuela, his adventures outside nato territory can also be seen as
operations or initiatives aimed at boosting his popularity or winning the chance to negotiate with the West.

All this is not intended to excuse the hostile activities of the Kremlin, but to emphasize that these attitudes can be an aggressive defense. In other words, Moscow, as in any war, sees counterrattacking, even preventive strike, as an indispensable element of the art of defense. Moscow, in today's confrontation with the West, thinks that the best defense option for it is to break up the unity of the West and change the minds of those who oppose it.

The crisis in Crimea in 2013 became international and there were comments that Ukraine would be divided due to unwanted rule in Kiev. In Crimea, where there is a Russian population of close to 60%, it is no surprise that Russia is active and the crisis is positively reflected in Russia. Crimea, which declared independence on March 11 and joined Russia on March 16, has drawn a backlash from NATO and some sanctions have been imposed on Russia. This leads to divisions between Russia and the West, causing the crisis to grow. With the conclusion of this crisis, it may be only a matter of time before the balance changes. The attitudes of the United States, the EU and NATO are further mobilizing the region.

Why is it important for Ukraine, Russia and the West?

Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine as a gift on the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's Russian rule. However, after the Soviets disbanded, it became the place where Ukraine and Russia had a conflict. The fact that the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol is on the borders of Ukraine and Russia wants to use it has been a big problem.

In 1991, Russia was forced to leave these regions to Ukraine, causing it to give other countries a say in the region after losing power there. After this period, Ukraine pursued a policy of rapprochement with the West. On the U.S. side, this region has become a strategic position to be an area that can prevent Russians from landing in the Mediterranean and to pave the way for the distribution of energy resources to Europe. Russia has not embraced Ukraine's independence for years. Ultimately, this country, which carries a Russian identity, serves as the gateway to Europe for Russia. Russia's Slavic Policy for the Eurasian dream is unfinished and it should be considered as a natural approach to want to keep this geography under control in order to advance it in the long term.

Consequences of NATO Sanctions

As of 2001, nato's policies were in line with us policies; it is revealed that there will be more US-based sanctions. The United States will need to intervene in Russian energy in order to impose sanctions against Russia. The West's use of this energy also reduces this possibility. The decision of the United States in this area constitutes the area where Germany will react first. (Askeroglu, 2014) NATO announced its decision to suspend civilian and military cooperation with Russia's invasion of Crimea at a meeting of member states in Brussels in April 2014, detailing aid to Ukraine. It should also be noted that Russia is a nuclear power if NATO's response turns into a conflict.
As a final sanction; On May 2, 2014, Russia threatened to shut down the Crimean Tatar parliament after Crimean tatar leader Mustafa Abdulcemil Crimeanoglu held a public rally after he was denied entry to Crimea from Moscow. It underlines the desire for Crimea to join Russia in response to Russia's responses as a result of the pressures. It is desirable to put forward a model of Russia that believes that development and economic support will be strengthened in this way.

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), founded in 1949 by 12 US-led states in order to prevent the Soviet spread in Europe and in case German Fascism was revived, is now a 26-member political and military organisation. Turkey joined NATO in 1952, along with Greece. Since then, military relations between Turkey and the United States have gained an institutional quality and continued to this day. To put it officially, "Turkish-American military strategic cooperation has a history of more than half a century, based on the two states joining NATO." Despite the ups and downs of Turkish-American relations during and after the Cold War, the NATO alliance has been a building block in relations between the two states and continues to do so today.

With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Cold War years were over and the bipolar world system ended. These developments, which ended the Cold War, raised the question of what the future of NATO would be in the early 1990s. Two different theses have clashed on this subject. The first thesis advocates the end of NATO's existence, as did the Warsaw Pact, which was dissolved on August 1, 1991; The second opinion suggested that NATO should be strengthened by gaining new functions in the face of off-field threats, citing tensions in the Gulf, the bloody transformation of Central and Eastern European countries, and uncertainty on Soviet soil, which began with the Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990. Especially with the events of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as a result of the instability created by the former Soviet geography and the Middle East, the second thesis gained weight, NATO strategies were revised and steps were taken towards expansion and transformation.

Within the international system that began to take shape after the Cold War, the United States emerged as a world hegemon and a single pole. Aiming to maintain its hegemony in line with the maximization of its national interests within the new world order, the United States considered NATO an important foreign policy tool. Strengthening alliance relations within NATO has been one of the foreign policy priorities of the United States. In this context, the United States has been both a pioneer and a supporter of NATO's policies of expansion and transformation.

**NATO's Transformation in the Face of Changing Threat Perceptions After the Cold War**

The end of the Cold War did not end the conflicts in the world, but rather some problems that were frozen by the balance of horrors in the bipolar world were rekindled. Regional conflicts have erupted in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and elsewhere in the world, and regional risks from uncertainty have become the focus of threat perceptions. The possibility of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons entering unsafe hands has given a
global quality to the scale of the threat. However, as the new wave of post-Cold War terrorism, unconventional threats presented by asymmetrical forces emerged (Ozcan, 2000).

Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, which includes the provision of collective defense, was implemented for the first time. After the events of 9/11, initiatives were launched to increase NATO's capabilities in the field of international counterterrorism. New reform packages were approved at the Prague Summit in November 2002, a reaction to 9/11. Statements of intent at the Prague Summit to support the development of the military concept and joint action plan against terrorism and the efforts of the international community in this direction have clarified nato's role in the fight against terrorism. On 28-29 June 2004, the 17th NATO Summit in Istanbul, the first time the 26-member NATO Summit, reaffirmed the Alliance's global role in the fight against terrorism (Aybet, 2004).

Nato's Expansion Policies After the Cold War

Nato expanded during the Cold War by incorporating Turkey, Greece, West Germany and Spain, and continued its expansion with the end of the Cold War. In accordance with the goal of securing these gains of NATO, the winner of the Cold War, and to strengthen and eliminate the division of Europe, it was agreed at the London Summit in June 1990 that NATO would establish regular diplomatic relations with the former Warsaw Pact member states. Immediately after the Rome Summit at the end of 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (KAIK) was established with the participation of NATO members and the Federal Republic of Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Kaik and the former socialist states have been called for dialogue, partnership and cooperation. In this way, a security umbrella was created outside NATO and the defense and security searches of these states were tried to be answered. Eastern European countries, as well as the former Soviet republics, became members of the KAIK. In June 1992, Georgia and Albania joined, bringing its membership to 38, including NATO members.

RESULT

It is clear that Russia has no intention of bringing other countries or troops into its backyard. NATO's military deterrence measures are also unlikely to yield results. Why shouldn't the same point for Crimea happen for the whole of Ukraine? If Ukraine remains in the option of choosing between the West and Russia, it is something that the West will predict that Russia will not make concessions. The fate of Ukraine, which cannot leave the historical heritage from Russia economically, politically and culturally, is more or less drawn. Russia, which dominates Sevastopol, will not give up its dominance in the Mediterranean.

Although Russia is not invited to the NATO exercises, it can be said that the exercise in Kaliningrad will be the scene of Russian challenges. Russia describes the exercise as a response to American missile defense systems. In Ukraine, an important region for gas distribution, Russia will manage Europe's gas. Since pipelines and routes are important to Russia, it will not give up control. Even if there is no war, the situation in Crimea will have a profound impact on Russia and Western relations.
Since Russia is also a nuclear power, it is necessary not to create a war environment. In this case, the policy of leaving Russia alone, especially the United States, can be followed. Russia, with its experience during the Cold War, feels that it will not allow it. The Kiev administration will continue to fight for Crimea, aiming for EU membership. Despite the crisis, the EU's signing of the political part of the association agreement with Ukraine shows that it is in favour of maintaining the rule of law and maintaining trade. It reveals the fact that the deal, which is also expected to be signed for free trade, will make Russia difficult.

The EU is also reluctant to announce additional sanctions against Russia. The election of the party supporting Russia in the South Ossetia elections, which left Georgia in 2008, raised concerns about the second Crimean case. Nato, which does not independently assume South Ossetia like Crimea, is concerned that Russia will increase its dominance in the Mediterranean by gathering these countries in itself (NATO Handbook, p.116-117).

In 1994, NATO decided to start a dialogue with six Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). As a result of these states responding positively to NATO's invitation, the political dialogue between NATO and these states has been enhanced through bilateral and multilateral meetings. At the 1997 Madrid Summit, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group was formed (NATO Handbook, p.116-117).

Nato's last wave of enlargement took place at the Prague Summit in September 2002. The Heads of Government of the nineteen member states have gathered to decide on the second round of enlargement after the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999. Ten state nomination applications were approved before the Prague Summit; There were important discussions before and during the summit about which of them would be invited to join.

While it was considered certain that Slovenia among the candidates would be invited because it would not cause both economic development and conflict with Russia, it was mentioned that the membership of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) would be left to the next process because of fear of Russia's reaction. Romania and Bulgaria were candidates with little chance of membership because their political and economic reforms were not enough. On the grounds that it is difficult to choose between candidates, some experts have raised the issue of accepting all candidates as members together (Gordon and Steinberg, 2001).

REFERENCES


