Appraisal Of Collaborating Affiliation Between British Government And Multan District's Punjabi Muslim Chiefs (1849-1857)

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Abstract

The colonial policy was founded on the basic premise of rewarding cooperation and punishing resistance. After many years of being loyal to the British, those who remained loyal were awarded prominent administrative positions. There have been various decades where the British have controlled politics in Multan. The notable families from Multan were well-known in the First Sikh War in 1849 and war of Independence 1857. This article describes how the Multan chief remained loyal to the British administration and, in general, was eager to display their devotion through any means necessary during the conflicts, as well as analyses the factors that influenced them to collaborate. It studied and explored the root cause of the problem in the Multan region and the actions the British took to quell the fighting in that region. The Muslim Chiefs of Punjab backed the British because of their grievances against the Sikh rule, particularly during the post-Ranjit Singh era, a period of instability and chaos. As new sources have materialized, this article has been updated to reflect it.

Key Words: Collaboration, Punjabi Muslim Chief, Multan,

Introduction:

Collaboration was an intermediary-based system of indirect rule. Tribal chiefs, clan leaders, and the landed gentry all wielded enormous power in their communities. Alloting colony lands to the collaborating elite ensured their loyalty. The colonization of canals and the Punjabisation of the Colonial Indian Army happened at the same time. In a well-regarded 1972 titled study “No-European Foundations of European Imperialism,” Dr Ronald Robinson deftly sketched out a "sketch" for a theory of collaboration. 'The concept of collaboration,' he explained,' suggests that the workings of imperialism controlled by indigenous collaborative networks connecting its European and Afro-Asian components at every level from external imperialism [or in other words,
that the workings of imperialism controlled by indigenous collaborative networks connecting their European and Afro-Asian components at every level from external imperialism [or in other words, that indigenous collaborative networks managed the workings of imperialism.” (Robinson, 1972)

It is well known that colonial rule in Asia and Africa relied heavily on the assistance of powerful local allies. With only a handful of soldiers and administration, the Europeans could dominate enormous swaths of land and population. The Cambridge historian Ronald Robinson popularized the concept of collaboration more than three decades ago. (Robinson & Gallagher, & Denny 1961) He believed that, in the absence of vast resources, the British operated their empire on the cheap by gaining the allegiance of local elites. They recognized indigenous elite groupings made up of tribal chiefs, landowners, traders, and business owners and used patronage to bind them to their rule. In exchange, the local elites maintained peace and order and aided the administration. Robinson's knowledge of multiple patterns of collaboration, including intra-elite competition, has been addressed especially in the contexts of Kenya and South Africa. Work on India, on the other hand, demonstrated that partnership was not a one-way street. (Atmore, 1984) (Mommsen, & Falla, 1959)

Robinson, one of the early pioneers of the Cambridge School of Historiography, proposed the sketch for collaboration theory. With Anil Seal's landmark article, 'Imperialism and Nationalism,' the thesis gained traction among the Cambridge School. According to (Seal, 1968). Collaboration is a nebulous concept that can refer to anything from acquiescence to resignation. Men collaborated with foreign regimes for a variety of reasons. (Bayly, 1975, 2004) (Fieldhouse, 1973) expresses a strong interest in the role of governmental power, nationalism, and religion. His comparison of the various upheavals, particularly the Indian insurrection (1857–1859), is excellent and a terrific tonic for exceptionality tendencies. Discuss colonial control's mechanisms and political repercussions. (Gallagher, Johnson, & Seal, 1973)

The role of elites and their loyalty to the colonial state is examined concerning several Indian regions; the strength of the British colonial state in India was often exaggerated. Its grasp on society remained weak at best, reliant on the assistance of indigenous elites and classes who played an integral role within the colonial system of governance. (Metcalf, 1979) for example, has highlighted this in connection to Awadh's taluqdas (big landholders), and Sarah (Ansari,1992) has used the concept of collaboration about Sindh's pirs (spiritual leaders) and Sufis (Islamic mystics), 9 it sets out to investigate the British System of Political Control.

Ian Talbot argues, concerns from colonial rulers prompted the establishment of a security state' in northwest India. He further argued, During the later British rule, the early European allies, chiefs, and tribal religious leaders, were joined by local indigenous public servants and entrepreneurs loyal to the power that offered them a living, (Talbot,1982, 1988) India’s defense relies on a strong Punjab due to "fear of Russian expansion" and "the location of Punjab." The authors of the essay by David Page assert that the Muslim West Punjab community contributed significantly to the
acquisition of the province, as well as to the suppression of the Mutiny of 1857. They offered services such as serving the Sikhs in the Sikh durbar and were rewarded with jagirs. The majority of these families were descended from peasants who rose to prominence by supporting and, in some cases, joining winning mills. Punjab's creation of a landowning class based on 'tribes' is tied to the 'colonial recruitment policy of the Indian army.' The Punjab government "quite strongly relied on this landowning class to recruit soldiers for the Army." (Page, 1987)

Viceroy Elgin of India convened a durbar, inviting among Punjab's largest and most prosperous landowners to attend. Durbars permitted local lords and chieftains to appear before the reigning king and offer their services in exchange for payment and security from the Mughals and Sikhs. The colonial rulers and landowners who constructed the structure on which British control in Punjab was predicated were fully aware of the durbar's symbolic significance. Notwithstanding their economic and military supremacy, the British in Punjab relied on the help of the local landed nobility to maintain revenue collection and the province's orderly administration. To actively adapt, the colonial state needed to collaborate with its landed friends by lavishing official benefits on them in exchange for their loyalty. (Javed Hassan, 2011)

When the British ruled India, the pirs' families' access to prestigious status and sound economic standing was important to their influence at the sub-regional and provincial levels. Members of the Shrine Family Guardians and landed gentry were the most powerful of the major political factions. The rural elite were united in a unified economic interest, linking them to the colonial state's allegiance. (Malcolm, 1928) The leading Qureshi and Sayyed families became foremost colonial authority supports in Multan. They kept the colonial powers in preserving local order and in recruiting military recruits. These deeds were rewarded with land grants. They were perfect collaborators for the British government due to their strength and authority in the neighborhood of Multan.

Various authors approach these subjects from distinct viewpoints, (Altat, 2021) argued the role of clans and tribes who allied with the British and aided the freedom fighters / Mujahideens. The predatory tribes of Multan's surrounding areas supported the freedom fighters, but the British repressed them and rewarded those who assisted the government in suppressing these freedom warriors. Another Scholar (Akhtar, 2019) explored, the shrine families and landed aristocracy have risen to prominence in the Multan region and the Punjab province. From the Muslim conquest to British control, the confluence of these two powerful local elites was the fundamental component of Multan politics. Every one of these undertakings is massive in scope, and it shows in the study of Multan's history. Present study reveals Collaboration was a system of indirect rule via middlemen. Collaborators included tribal chiefs, clan leaders, and the landed aristocracy, all of whom exercised enormous power in their communities. Punjab’s were appointed as honorary magistrates, and they played an important role in maintaining law and order in the countryside.
Multan was under Sikh domination at the time of the British conquests, and the elite's picture had been subordinated to the armed strength of Hindus and Sikhs. (Chund, 1884) As a result, most Muslim masses and elites were uninterested in the defense of Multan under the Sikhs and Hindus. They hence became natural welcome-allies of the British in the 1849 invasion of Multan. The British seemed like liberators for the Multani Muslim elites, and a trusting relationship developed between the Multani elites and the British Imperial authorities. The Multani Muslims' alliance with British Imperialists was reinforced during the War of Independence in 1857 when the Multani elites supported British forces with both human resources and materiel. As a result, Multani elites were well represented in the British Imperial government. Such participation started with nominations and was later expanded to include elections. (Bhatti, &L Kanwal, 2014) This landed elite included the top families in all three of the major religious groupings of the undivided province — Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs — and the patriarchal leaders of the most powerful buradaris (clan brotherhoods). The British called the chiefs or heads of Punjab. These chiefs have been the devoted supporters of the British authorities in the Punjab for almost 90 years. (Andrew, 1991)

The Punjab administration used a variety of strategies to begin the process of rebuilding rural elite that it had only recently attempted to demolish. Grants of land were also given to officials, and local collaborators who aided the colonial government, in addition to conferring magisterial powers on chosen landed elites in order to enhance the colonial government's authority. In areas where the British had already formed an alliance with the traditional elites, like as in Multan, additional concessions and allowances were provided to reward the traditional elites for their allegiance. (Rosberry, 1987) The British had allied with the sajjada nashins of the local Muslim shrines in Multan, leveraging their tremendous social and political clout to crush the Sikhs in the area. (Gilmartin. 1988)

Reasons for Collaboration:

Primary reasons had a crucial role in shaping our decision. Punjab's rulers and prominent families worked with the British during the War of 1857-58, which escalated into the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Punjab Muslim leaders cooperated with the British to assist the Sikhs because of differences with the Sikh government. Maharaja Ranjit Singh's aggressiveness against the rajas of the Sikh princely states inspired the rajas to beg British protection, and the British consented to grant it, signing the Treaty of 1809. (Cunningham, 1852) Also, in 1857-58, Sikh leaders were either killed or forced to flee from Punjab due to the Anglo-Sikh Wars. (Punjab Administration Report 1856-57,1858)

Also, Sikh Chiefs' idea that they could peacefully coexist with the British led them to seek British control. (Gandhi,2013) Following the formal arrest of Mul Raj, the British authorities assumed control. Because the long-term solutions have been applied, these changes have been both prosperous and long-lasting. They created administrative entities like divisions, districts, and
tehsils and divided the whole country into them. The division and district headquarters for Multan was designated as Multan. (Nabi, 1938)

Grain output in 1857-58 contributed to the resolution of the Indian rebellion in Punjab. Welfare-oriented development initiatives carried out by the British administration in Punjab from 1849 to 1857 succeeded in gaining the British people's trust. (Punjab Administration Report 1857-58, 1859) There were disparities in socioeconomic situations between Punjab and the northwestern Indian provinces. Inventor and educationist (Khan, 2000) in the first instance, the British government did not confiscate property, whereas, in the second, they did. Eleven-year-old (Jalal, 2001)

Clan rivalry and politics of power were major elements in the participation of prominent families with the British. Clans that supported the independence movement were pitted against clans who supported the British Empire instead. Conflict between Punjabis and Purabiyas, for example, served as an impetus for the alliance. The British, on the other hand, cleverly tapped into the tensions between Muslims and Sikhs. The Muslims of Punjab viewed the British as saviors against the Sikhs, while the Sikhs viewed them as avenging Delhi's Muslim rulers. These were the factors that contributed to a small number of people in the study developing (Saranga, 2015)

The British Government's principal objective in Punjab was to raise money, military recruitment, and political support for the Raj through the landed nobles. All of the British Government's policies are focused on accomplishing their core purpose of economic expansion and military recruitment at all costs, and achieving this fundamental objective necessitated the political support of the local landed nobility. The British used these landowning elite for financial gain, political influence, and military recruiting. In exchange, the landed aristocracy received free gifts of titles, jagirs, and land, among other things. The landed aristocracy's sole professed goal has been self-preservation in general. To aid the British administration, the landed gentry recruited lambardars, zaildars, and several honorary Magistrates. (Puri, 1985)

Sikh Aristocracy:

Members of the Sikh nobility were able to adapt to the changing circumstances of colonial authority not only because of the honours, titles, and awards they got but also because of their financial resources. They were permitted to keep a fraction of their jagirs in addition to their proprietary holdings, given pensions; they were given land grants; allowed to buy additional property, and they were allowed to invest in business and industry. British even throughout the Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845-1846 and 1848-1849, 23 were devoted to Britain, six were neutral, and only nine supported the Sikh kings. The British secured their loyalty support in a variety of methods after 1857-58. They were granted the honour, titles, honours, and honorary positions, for which the majority of them were eager to compete. Viceregal darbaries, six provincial darbaries, and four divisional darbaries existed in 1891; eleven provincial and seven divisional darbaries
existed in 1909, and the comparable figures in 1940 were eight and twelve. (Grewal & Sharma, 1987)

We have included 250 families from Lepel Griffin's collection who were judged to have "rank, money, and local power" in 1865. Nearly half of these families were Sikh, 25% Hindu, and 20% Muslim. The majority of Jats among Sikhs was higher than any other group among the nobility. (Griffen, 1940) The foundations of British policy toward the aristocracy in the Punjab were built throughout the regency period, most notably during John Lawrence's term as resident at Lahore. Henry Lawrence, his elder brother, was a supporter of India's rulers and chieftains. He believed that British officers could convert these guys into effective friends by combining respect and friendliness with firmness in their dealings with them. On the other hand, John Lawrence saw the princess and chieftains as parasitic jagirdars and dubious political allies. According to Sharma, “To be precise the relationship between the former jagirdaders and the British Government was that of mutual independence. Both needed each other for their maintenance and sustenance. The rise of political movements based on popular protest diminished the usefulness of the former jagirdars and hence their utility to the state.” (Sharma, 1998)

**Historical Multan region:**

Multan is a historical region located in the Subcontinent region of Pakistan. The city's environs have been inhabited since the ancient Indus valley civilization, according to legend. Multan's physical location has kept it a significant region for ages. At the confluence of the Ravi and Chenab rivers, it was designed as a trading route. (Ashiq Durrani, 1981) For thousands of years, the city has been well-planned and well-fortified. As far back as Multan's known history goes, the town was a political and cultural hotbed from antiquity until the arrival of Mughal power in India. (Humaira Faiz Dasti, 1998)

Multan became divided into various political groups around the late eighteenth century. During the second half of the eighteenth century, several Muslim lords established free kingdoms in Multan, including Multan's governors Shuja Khan and Muzaffar Khan. (Sachdeva, 1993). These Muslim sultans occupied a three-tiered space. The first was Afghan governors who gained considerable freedom due to Afghanistan's political transition, such as Multan and Mankera's rulers. Second were powerful individuals associated with various religious groupings who amassed strength, acquired territory, amassed income, and rose to the chief. At the same time, the remnants of them became the earlier Jagirdars and arbitrator Zamindars under the Mughals. (Sachdeva, 1993).

For many years, this region has focused on Muslim elites such as pirs, feudal lords, and shrine guardians. The rulers of the Subcontinent and Punjab have always had solid relations, especially with the Muslim religious class, to govern and administer the Multan region and tribes down to the Indus and beyond using the influence of Pir and shrine families' elite. (Syed Nawazish Ali, 1940) To ensure state legitimacy, excellent administration, and peace, the subcontinent's rulers
solicit the assistance and loyalty of Pirs and shrine guards from around the land. **Metcalf, 1979** explores the long-term consequences of the 1857 event on British policies in India. During the 1857 crisis, the devotion of Punjab's landholding classes resulted in additional acknowledgement of this region for cementing British rule in North India.

Sayyids, who were direct descendants of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH), were at the top of the social scale. Qureshis, who belonged to the Prophet's Quresh tribe, were classed slightly lower. From the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, a continual influx of Sayyid and Qureshi families into Multan was to propagate Islam. **(Abenante, 2020)** The Pirs wielded enormous power, attracted Muslims as disciples, and were mostly sustained by offerings. Pirs wielded such power in society that being Pirless was considering themselves were used disgraceful. A man would traditionally adopt his father's Pir and keep him for the rest of his life. Pirs visited their murids regularly, who treated them with great respect and gave them free food and excellent transportation. These Pirs did not teach much about religion, but they did sell charms and amulets to their superstitious Murids. Murids did not believe they were underserved. The ordinary person's Islam was based on a belief in the power of holy men to bestow life benefits such as the birth of a son and the prevention of livestock illness. Pirs were admired for their supernatural abilities rather than their religious knowledge. **(Multan District Gazetteer, 1901-02,1902)**

**Multan's Politics:**

Multan's political scene exemplified a typical system. The city's inhabitants can be categorized into three groups based on tribe/caste, religion, and profession. Multan district identity was defined by its tribe and domain, as religion and culture strongly affected inhabitants' occupations. **(Bhatti, Akhtar, & Kanwal, 2013)** The British government's primary objective was to strike a balance between economic change and political stability. Local elites served as a buffer between the populace and the colonial administration. Custodians of the sacred shrines, which were formerly middlemen, now serve as masters and mentors. When it came to Multan, castes and creeds of the region assisted the British while receiving positions of influence and power. Well-known families such as the Gardezi Syeds, Qureshi's of Kabirani, Qadirpur, Jalalpur, Ghauspur, Gilani Syeds, Sadozais, Badozais, Khakwanis, Mullazais, Bosans, Khokhars, Bagai, and Raizadgans have all served in prominent positions in the past. They have been granted titles and honours by the British. **(Griffen, & Massey1910)**

Before the colonial era, these elites fulfilled the functions of local authorities. The colonial administration and local elites formed a patron-client relationship throughout time. All colonial measures, including revenue-free jagirs, tirni (grazing tax), the Court of Wards Management, and the Land Alienation Act of 1900, benefited these local elites, which included Jagirdars, Pirs, and SajadahNashins. These grants were quite ancient, with the majority deriving from Mughal Sanadsand being used for pastoral purposes in south-western Punjab. **(Bilal, 2018)**
These local elites were also given zaildar posts, [honorary magistrates] (Punjab District Gazetteers, Multan District, Statistical Tables: 1913) titles and large land allocations in the local administration. (Settlement Report of Multan District,1880)Since the British East India Company annexed Punjab in 1849, all land, including waqf estates associated with various Sufi temples, has been under the administration of the Company through the Court of Wards. The East India Company established the Court of Wards as a legal authority. Its goal was to protect heirs and their assets when the heir was deemed minor and unable to act autonomously. Many religious leaders were compensated and awarded land as part of the Company's collaboration policy because of the great shrines' regional character and their hereditary custodianship's extremely high socio-religious significance. They were given new territories to maintain the socio-religious institutions under their control during the settlement process, and these aristocrats also collected taxes on behalf of the central authority. (Buhler, 1996)

**Multan's campaign of 1849 and Collaboration:**

Multan's campaign was a game of thrones between Hebert Edwards and the local Muslim ruling class. Muslims Mutinies, a religious and military tribe, and Hindu Bania represented one group and Hindus by the other. (Kauser,2013) In the words of Herbert Edwards, “Men like these, who to natural bravery, add ability and local knowledge, can never cease to be of real use to Government. (Punjab Bard of Administration to Govt of India, 1849.)

Mulraj personally sent Gulam Mustafa Khan Khakwani, one of his top commanders, to Edwards in early 1848, conveying his desire to relinquish control peacefully. Ghulam Mustafa Khakwani and Faujdar Khan met on the east bank of the Sindh River on May 8th and began a polite chat. (H. Edwards, 1996) Gulam Mustafa Khan began bartering and persuaded Edwards that Pathans were willing to quit Mulraj if Edwards guaranteed that all of their lands and property, as well as their employees, which Mulraj had seized, would be returned to them. At this departing point, Edwards provided them with a handwritten promise for their lives, property, and honour.6-(Roseberry, 1987)

Syed Murad Shah, from GardeziSyeds, was the first focal contact to serve the British in 1848 when Multan was encircled. (Gillani, 1938) Murad Shah was Multan to his native town of Korai Baloch, 15 miles from Multan. When the British arrived in Sardarpur, they needed some sharp-minded locals intimately familiar with the area and its inhabitants. The community praised Murad Shah as one of the respected Syeds due to his wit and sharp mind. Murad Shah was promptly summoned by the Major General and asked to stay and live with the British camp to ensure its safety and security and make the surrounding territory available to British forces. Murad Shah took up the offer and joined the British Army. This marked the beginning of Murad's career. When the East India Company took possession and administration of Punjab on June 8, 1849, Murad was appointed Peshkar of Shorkot. He was promoted to Teshildari in 1850 and served in various
locations for thirteen years. His relations with the British grew stronger by the day, and he kept his locales and posting stations in such good shape that his career progressed. Murad was elevated to Extra Assistant Commissioner in 1864 and appointed Native Agent Bahawalpur State the following year. (Gillani, 1938)

On January 10, 1876, Murad's untimely death paved the way for his son Syed Hassan Bakhsh Gardezi to join the administrative apparatus to reward his father's British allegiance. Hassan was appointed to several positions, including Member Municipal Committee Multan in 1882, Vice President of the Municipal, Honorary Judicial Magistrate in 1891, upgraded with power and duties in 1893, and Khan Bahadur in 1899. Hassan rose from Divisional Darbar to Provincial Darbar in 1905, only two decades after being appointed. Hassan, like his father, was unquestionably loyal. He sent the British government 8000 rupees towards the First World War budget. (Griffen, & Massey, 1910)

This was the context in which Muslim political and religious elites chose to align themselves with colonial officers. Following the capture of Multan, the East India Company sought to reward their battle friends. Sarfaraz Khan Sadozai was a clandestine British agent during the war. (Board of administration to Govt of India, 1849). Sarfraz Khan was the last surviving son of former Afghan king Muzafar Khan, who was assassinated during the Sikh annexation war. The Sikh government provided him with a lifetime pension but compelled him to remain under their surveillance. In 1849, Sarfraz Khan petitioned the Board of Administration for a pension on the grounds that he was the Tribe's chief. The Board determined that he was entitled to a lifetime pension for himself and his family. (Proceedings of Political Department. 1850) Numerous Pathan allies received prizes for their efforts throughout the battle, but the Board was particularly generous with Sarfraz Khan. Local warriors, such as Faujdar Khan, Gulam Sarwar Khan Khakwani, Sadiq Muhammad Khan Badozai, and Gulam Qasim Khan Alizai, were appointed as permanent slaves in Herbert Edwards' irregular army. The East India Company secured their raj after generously dispersing incentives to Pathan allies. They also made an oath of faith for future aid in times of need. The Company had a firm grip on these tribal leaders because the members of these tribes were instantly ready to fight with the enemy at the mere command of their tribal leaders. (Ridgway, 1910)

**Collaboration and War of Independence 1857:**

A battle for state power among many candidates produces political classes in society who seek to administer the state's functions and enjoy the state's authority. The imperial structure of state authority never balances the governing style and the state's people. As a result, the 1857 war of independence, the British instituted political changes throughout the subcontinent. They established a controlled western government model with nominated and community seats in the national legislative assembly, province legislatures, district boards, and cantonment boards. The British state power paradigm produces a loyal class for the colonial ruler through the nexus of pir, guard, and police. (Rosebary, 1987)
The war of 1857 was the following litmus test for the Muslim leaders’ loyalty. The great revolt of 1857 was dubbed the Mutiny of the Sepoys by the British and a few indigenous Indians. A close investigation of the events, the backgrounds of the leaders, and the social classes of those involved would reveal the rising to be a desperate attempt by the populace and princes to shake off the British yoke. Makhdoom Shah Mahmood, a descendant of Baha Uddin Zakaria Multani, aided the British against the Sikhs during the 1848-49 siege of Multan and received 2,000 rupees and half of the mauza (a type of administrative district corresponding to a specific land area containing one or more settlements) as a personal gift of a land grant (Gallani, 1938).

Multan district remained under government control during the native troops' revolt because the government had the full support of their local allies. The Pir's and Pathans assisted their masters in making Multan and the Punjab region a colonial stronghold over the entire subcontinent for the next century. The British enlisted the help of their local landlords, crushed the sepoys, and annexed Multan. Multan appeared to be a mainstay of colonial strength in the region after that. According to G.W. Hamilton, Commissioner of Multan..., “Lying near the confluence of the great rivers of that province, commanding their navigation and the entrance to the Punjab from the Southward, surrounded and separated from the seat of government by turbulent and predatory tribes, the city and fortress of Multan occupy a most prominent position as one of the defensive keys in the Punjab.” (Punjab General Proceedings, 1860) When insurrection broke out in the North-Western provinces, at this critical juncture, the Indus valley was the only link to the rest of the globe. At the time of the revolt, Multan's army consisted of the fourth company of European artillery; the third brigade of indigenous horse artillery; the 62nd regiment of local infantry; the 69th regiment of first regular cavalry; the 3rd Kater Mookhi police battalion; and 250 horse riders. (Voyal, 1858)

Makhdum Shah Mahmud Qureshi was the most notable of them; he was the founder of the Sajjad nation. His steadfast commitment was important in retaining the Muslim populace's submission. None of these fields has a history of recruiting liberation fighters. Additionally, he recruits the army and police with zeal. (Proceeding of Punjab Political Department, 1958) He acted admirably for the British in 1857, informing Commissioner Multan of any noteworthy occurrence that came to his attention. He was a founding member of the newly-formed police force and sent twenty soldiers and horses to Ghulam Mustafa Khan's risla (a company of troops). Furthermore, he provided personnel for police and infantry levies. He joined Colonel Hamilton, Commissioner Multan, and twenty-five horse riders against independence fighters at Gugera. He took on some of the camp's chores and guarded the march's baggage. According to the Commissioner, his presence that day had a dramatic
influence on freedom fighters, who thought that the most potent local chief was conspiring against them in violation of their religious convictions. (Ibid)

Makhdum Shah Mahmud and his retainers assisted the Commissioner in retaining possession of a vital bridge over the Wali Muhammad Canal. (Proceedings of (Punjab Political Department, 1860) (Punjab Board of Revenue, 1860) (PBOR, 1860) Shah Mahmud received a Rs 3,000 gift in appreciation of his services. In addition to the eight permanent wells valued at Rs 550, the Shiren's monetary stipend was exchanged for a jagir worth Rs 1,750. He was also given a Bhangiwala Bagh garden worth Rs 150 per year and a robe of distinction for Rs 600. (Proceeding of Punjab Political Department, 1858) (Foreign Department Proceedings 1858) (Chopra, 1940)

Makdum Shah Mahmud was the ninetieth descendant of Baha-ud-din. He was the son of Sheikh Hassan Shah and adopted son of Bibi Raji Sabiha, the daughter of Seikh Muhammad Ghaus. He died in 1969, and his son Bahawal Bakhsh replaced him as sajada nasin of the Baha-ud-Din and Rukn-i-alam shrines. Makhudam Shah was buried in the Baha-un-Din shrine with considerable pomp and circumstance. Hundreds of Muhannadans attended his funeral, and the local courts were closed for the day in his honour. (Griffen & Massay, 1910) The department commissioner presided over the dastar–bandi ritual, during which Bahawal Bakhsh was granted an honour gown and designated protector of the shrines. Bahawal Bakhush received the jagir in nine villages, his father's garden grant, and a portion of the canal garazingdues collected in the Mailsi Tahsil. One-fourth of Mailsi's mouza Sairth revenues were set aside in perpetuity for his family. In 1880, the Makhdum was awarded an honorary garment at Lahore's public Darbar to recognize his service during the Afghan war. He assisted in the acquisition of camels for transportation purposes and rendered unnecessary personal services. (Chopra, 1940)

Bahawal Bakhsh, Shah Mahmud's son, was named Honorary Magistrate of Multan in 1877. (Punjab Government Quterly, 1880) He served on the Municipal Committee for numerous years, gaining him a place in the Provincial Darbars. He died in 1896 and was succeeded in death by his son Shaikh Muhammad Shah. As sajada nashin of shrines and head of the family, his younger brother, the current Makhdun Shaikh Hassan Bakhsh, took over from him. He has since passed away. At the end of 1896, he was named Honorary Magistrate and advanced to the rank of khan Bahadur in 1900. He is a rural Darbari who married the daughter of a former Multan Tahsildar, Main Mubarak Ali. His eldest son, Shaikh Murid Hassan, was a Risaldr in a camel cadre. For a time after the Makhdun went seriously into debt, the Court of Wards oversaw his estate. Makhdun Shaikh Hassan Bakhsh was a Multan Municipality member as well as an Honorary Magistrate. Shaikh Hassan Bakhsh was a member of the Multan Municipality. He was well-served in both of these capacities, and in 1905, he has bestowed the title of Khan Bahadur. (Griffen & Massay, 1910)
Makhum Syed Nur Shah Gilani, who was Sajjada nashin of Musa Pak Shaheed of Multan, was one of Syed Yousaf Raza Galani, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, (Galani, 2006) of Multan. He was awarded a khilat of Rs 300 and a sanad in 1859 by John Lawerance in recognition of his (Chopra, 1940). Similarly, when the battle began, Sadiq Muhammad Khan Badozai of Multan s in Lahore. He arrived in Multan and joined Colonel Hamilton's expedition against the Gugera freedom fighters. He aided in the preparation of rafts that the force used to bridge the Ravi River at Thali. He also assisted the British during the Anglo-Sikh Wars and was granted a Rs 200 annual annuity. He was given Muhammad Khanwala Garden in perpetuity for his efforts during the battle and a life jagir at Lautfabad and Kot Malik. Along with a well in Bahawalpur valued at Rs 2 937 (Proceedings of the Political Department, 1858), he was appointed Assessor of Income Tax in Multan. Upon completion of the income tax assessment, he has set tehsildar of Shujabad. (Griffen, & Massey,1910)

They allied themselves with the British as well as with the Lungrial clan, which derives its name from a more significant meaning of "public kitchen" because their ancestor used to run an open kitchen for the beggars and faqirs of the neighbourhood (Ibbetson,1916) who held strong positions in the pasture tracts of the Multan District. They were the forefathers of former Minister Malik Iqbal Lungriyal and his son Nouman Lungrial, who is now a member of the National Assembly. At the outset of the Gugera uprising, Hamilton dispatched orders to Machhia, ordering him to arrest any freedom fighters he could come into contact with. The reward for apprehending a freedom fighter leader was Rs 100, and the incentive for charging an ordinary freedom fighter was Rs 20. (Roseberry,1987) Machhia and Bahawal raised a force of 500 men, which successfully guarded the district's eastern border. Similarly, when the Joyia clan emulated their fellow clansmen in Gugera and took up arms, Deputy Commissioner Voyle was dispatched from Multan with 100 mounted police to deal with this threat, and the Lungrials were directed to cooperate with him. Near Sahuka (a village of Burewala District Vehari), Machhia and Bahawal joined their men and informed the British that the Joyias were preparing for a night attack. The Joyia freedom fighters attacked just before dawn, but the British, forewarned by the Lungrials, were ready and defeated. In reprisal, the entire male population of Sahuka, including the beater of their war drum, was put to the sword, and grain stores were burnt. The captured livestock was hand over to the Lungrials. (Proceedings of Political Department, 1958)

Machhia and Bahawal also assisted Mustafa Khan Khakawani in the defeat of the freedom fighters at Kaeampur on the Diwanwah canal on September 5, 1857, according to historical records. This confrontation resulted in the death of Bahawal Lungrial. (Roseberry, 1987) The Lungrials also contributed Ghulam Mustafa Khan Khakwani's risala, which totalled fifteen soldiers. Machhia Lungrial was appointed as zaildar in recognition of his contributions. In 1861, he was designated Honorary Police Officer for Sarai Sidhu East, earning Rs 200 per
annum as a reward for his efforts. His territory was 270 square miles and had a population of
3,750 people. (Punjab Board of Revenue Report, 1927) As well as the cash prize of Rs 300,
he was awarded a jagir at Rs 150 per annum for life, a khilat for Rs 75, and a khilat worth Rs
75. (Proceedings of the Punjab Political Department (1958) (Punjab Board of Revenue,
PBOR, 1860) are examples of this. Machhia Lungrial's sons, Malik Muhammad Fazil and
Malik Bahadur Ali, were later granted property in recognition of their father's contributions
to the British during 1857-1858. (Foreign Department Proceeding, 1860); (Punjab Board
of Revenue, PROB 1860)

Walidad Lungrial was given a lifetime pension of Rs 300. He was the son of Bahawal Lungrial
(co-chief and brother of Machhia Lungrial), who was murdered battling the sepoys and over
whose remains a memorial was erected by direction of Commissioner Hamilton. He was the
forefather of Haji Ghulam Jafar Sargana, Chairman District Council Khanewal. (Proceeding
of the Punjab Political Department, 1858, PROB 1867) Walidad took up the Lungria co-
chieftainship from his father. (Punjab Board of Revenue, PBOR, 186, PFD 1860)

British authorities also summoned the clans in the Multan District on the Ravi for assistance,
and they immediately complied. Salabut Sargana, a prominent member of the Sargana clan,
promptly gathered 100 followers at the tehsil of Sarai Sidhu, and he was quickly followed by
the Hiraj and other clans. (Punjab Munity Reports, 1858, 23) Hiraj is a branch of the Sail
clan, with most of its members residing in the District Khanewal. As ruler of the Hiraj clan
during the war of 1857, Sultan Hiraj also collaborated with the British government. He moved
quickly to protect the Sari Sidhu tehsil headquarters, with 13 horse riders and 20-foot soldiers.
He soon assembled a force of 30 horse riders and 120 footmen to help British authorities in
their efforts to safeguard the country's farmland. (Proceeding of Punjab Political
Department, 1958) Additionally, Sultan Hiraj supplied four men to Mustafa Khan
Kwakawani's army. He further distinguished himself in an encounter with independence
fighters on 5 September 1857 at Karampur on the Diwanwa Canal. (PFD, 1860, Punjab
Board of Revenue (PBOR, 1867) For his faithfulness during the war, the British
administration awarded him a jagir of Rs 100 per year for life, a robe of honour (khilat) for
Rs 75, and a cash prize of Rs 300. (85, Proceeding of Punjab Political Department, 1958;
PBOR, 1867) Murad Bakhsh Bhutta of Khairpur Bhutta (Sargan, 2020) (a village near Multan
Cantt) supported the British in 1849 and 1857 and was rewarded for his efforts. (District
Gazzter Multan, 1923-24, 1926)

Hayat Shah Qureshi and Murad Shah Qureshi of Ghouspur Qureshi (near Tulumba) rendered
valuable assistance to the British in 1857 and received appropriate rewards. (88, Griffen,
1940) Murad Shah was grunted one-eighth of the village of Jitali in District Multan,
(PPRD, 1860) Ziadat Khan Daha of Khanwal and his son, Shah Muhammad Khan Daha, Daha
clan is the Rajput branch. This family includes local politicians Haji Irfan Khan Daha (ex-
MPA), Muhammad Khan Daha, and Nishat Khan Daha Khan MPA. (90 From Sargana book) offered valuable service throughout the war, for which Shah Muhammad was appointed divisional darbari and zaildar, Son of Sultan Hiraj, Alla Yar, who directed the famine of 1899-1900, held an honorary post under the Government in the Hissar District and was Honorary Extra Assistant Commissioner, (Multan District Gazetteer,1923-24,1926)

During the war, Mustafa Khan Khakwani stayed loyal to the British, and he was credited with raising an army of regular Horses. (Punjab Munity Report,1858) (Proceedings of Punjab Political Department, 1858) Mustafa Khakhwani’s risala of 110 men fought out of district limits was the sole Multan unit. They had been in service to the British in Haryana, serving as a self-appointed field force under General von Cortlandt. (Cave-Brone, 1861) Following his part in repressing the freedom fighter at District Gugera, he supported the British in controlling the uprising. He obtained significant donations of land, an annual jagir of the monetary value of Rs 1,000, a khejari of Rs 1,000, a khilat worth Rs 1,000, and the title of Khan Bahadur, a beautiful sword, and two pistols (Griffen, 393) He received substantial land grants, a jagir of Rs 1,000 per annum, a khilat worth Rs 1,000 and the title of Khan Bahadur, a fine sword, and a brace of pistols in exchange for his efforts. Ghulam Qadir, Mustafa Khan's son, was appointed Honorary Magistrate at Multan in 1877. (The Quartely Civil List of Punjab, 1860,) Multan city was appointed four Honaray Magistrates in 1877. As previously stated, these four magistrates included Bahawal Bakhash and Ghulam Qadir Khan. In 1879, two additional Magistrate positions were added. These four magistrates included, as previously stated, Bahawal Bakhash and Ghulam Qadir Khan. In 1879, two more Magistrates were appointed. The government approved a declaration of jagirs totalling Rs 1,050 assigned to Ghulam Mustafa Khan, Khan Bahadur Maula Dad, Macchia Lungari, and Sultan Hiraj in the Multan District for their services during the war. (Proceedings of Revenue Department, 1860)

Conclusion:

This in-depth investigation has shed light on the partnership mechanisms and Muslim Punjabi leaders in Punjab's Multan area, which is critical. Practically all the Muslim chiefs had grievances against the Sikh regime, so they helped the British. The Punjab local Elite played a crucial role in the politics of colonial Punjab to be a bridge between the ruling class and the masses. This elite class provided a gateway to the British Government in the form of different platforms to procure their vested political goals in colonial Punjab. (Maqbool Awan, 2016) The case study of Multan district throwing primary data showed a clear picture of the collaborators of the Muslim chiefs during the wars and was rewarded by the British Government. The local Makhdooms, Khakwanis, Kureshis, and Hirajs, joined and supported the British Government, fighting against these inexperienced and ill-equipped independence warriors. It was followed by other local leaders and people being handed lands, titles. Internal management flaws and the pro-British views of a few families in Multan assisted the British in occupying the district. There was a massive uprising that swept the Subcontinent. The various legislative initiatives and judicial rulings were also interpreted
as an attack on municipal structures. The cartridge issue sparked the incident, and the military, Princess, and the general public reacted. There was little reaction in Punjab during the enormous battle. But we observed how the people of Multan and the surrounding areas reacted and stood firm against the British. According to Dr Tahir Mahmood, views, the struggle for local authority and influence infused the collaborative process with a regional flavor. In the same way that Punjabi tribal rulers used official patronage to defeat opponents to their dominance, the government could use this competition to its advantage. (Mahmood, 2016) In other words, collaboration was a two-way dynamic process rather than a one-way, top-down connection. I agreed with his approach, and the Mutlanies were not the only prominent West Punjab family with a long history of collaboration. Moreover, not all districts benefited from such generous federal funding. The result is that we are witnessing the in this case study, a collaborative mechanism is operating at peak efficiency. About forty-seven prominent chieftains were rewarded for their “loyalty” from 1849 to 1857 with Titles like Khan Bahadur or Sardar Bahadur, Military honours like the Order of British India or the Order of Merit, Cash awards, Khil’ats, Jagirs, Pensions, Land grants. (Griffen, 1940)

Table of Rewards from 1849-1857

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number Of Chiefistan</th>
<th>Number of titles and honours Of title</th>
<th>Cash khi’lats Numbers/values RS</th>
<th>Jagirs Numbers/values</th>
<th>Pensions Numbers/values</th>
<th>Number of land Grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22,900</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25,250</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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