A Critical Study To Turkey's Political Transition And Administrative Reform

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Abstract

This article presents a historical overview beginning in 1949, when the new democratic administration initiated administrative improvements based on international research. Following World War II, there was an increase in the number of Civil Servants, as well as economic concerns such as rising inflation and declining living conditions. The bureaucracy's problems with successive governments stem from their failure to comprehend the bureaucracy's role. During the 1960 revolution, three groups with specific responsibility for reorganising economic and administrative institutions and executing five-year plans were established. Discusses the long-term effects of the excessive inspection and evaluation that has persisted in all areas of government activity.

Keywords: Administration, Bureaucracy, Politics, Reforms, History, Turkey.

Introduction

On the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. The Turks constructed an entirely modern political system with political parties, parliament, and elected executives under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk (Robinson, 1963). The Ottoman political structure was extensively overhauled by the Republic's founders. As a result, the early years of the Republic were marked by major political and administrative changes, among other things (Lewis, 1961). By the conclusion of WWII, Turkey started the transition to multi-party politics. In the 1950 general elections, the Democratic Party conquered the Republican People's Party, which had been the only party for the previous 27 years, (Karpat, 1959).
The DP administrations, which were in power from 1950-1960, were marked by a reduction in the state's engagement in commercial and social affairs, a drop in bureaucratic authority, and a fast expansion of private sector enterprises (Simpson, 1965).

The final DP administration was ousted on May 27, 1960, by military commanders who alleged that the Democratic Party governments' political tyranny had pushed the nation to the verge of civil war. The military dictatorship implemented a slew of changes, including a new constitution, before conducting fresh elections in 1961. (Weiker, 1963).

Attempts to promote economic growth were undertaken via five-year plans throughout the 1960s and 1970s in Turkish politics, which saw severe political party conflict (Cohn, 1970).

The military delivered an ultimatum in March 1971, seeking substantial policy reforms. The government was forced to resign. During the interregnum between 1971 and 1973, a fresh set of administrative changes was implemented. The multi-party system was reestablished in 1973 (Erim, 1972).

In the early 1980s, the post–1960 and 1971 trends were replicated. For the third time in September 1980, the military seized control of the country. Involvement was come after by a number of refinement measures, including administrative ones.

This research focuses on the government's reform commissions, which were established to reduce bureaucratic agencies and processes. Because comprehensive administrative rectification in Turkey has always been attempted via these ceremonial organizations, these committees and their attempts to rectify the bureaucracy are worth investigating. This research focuses on administrative reform initiatives in Turkey after 1945, that is, throughout the multi party era.

THE PERIOD FROM 1946 TO 1960:

Following WWII, administrative reform became a key priority in many growing countries. As a result, not only did the literature on public administration and administrative rectification begin to pile up, but new international organizations began sponsoring a variety of plans aimed at improving the administrative systems of developing countries, emphasizing the importance of public administration in the development process. "In the early 1950s, providing technical assistance to the world's impoverished was a novel concept (Birkhead 1967: 14). As a consequence, support for a broad variety of projects was easily accessible on a bilateral and multilateral basis."

Turkey, which had re-established strong ties with the West at the time, was inspired by these developments as well, and in the late 1940s and early 1950s, worked to modernize its public administration. Foreign experts and commissions prepared five of the six reports issued during this time period. Table 1 highlights the tasks of the commissions constituted at the period, as well as the dates on which they were founded and reports were delivered.
As seen in Table 1, the administrative changes in issue were intended to have a broad breadth and reach. Almost often, the reform commissions were tasked with researching and recommending reforms for the whole government bureaucracy. The rectification commissions were designed to enhance organizational structure, administrative management, and personnel management.

All of the commissions began with the same assumptions and concluded with the same conclusions. The commissions, for example, thought restructuring was a good method to improve government management. They admitted on the notion of forming a small number of functional ministries comprised of similar departments, and their suggestions were founded on that assumption. The recommendations for administrative management and personnel administration included the introduction of Organization and Methods (O and M) units, new administrative techniques, the centralization of staff services, the establishment of a amalgamated civil service structure based on merit principles, foremost personnel agency, an emphasis on training, and improvements in accounting and budgeting procedures. Tutum (1994: 87–118) based the bulk of his ideas on Western public administration concepts and practices.

**Table 1. The Administrative Reform Commissions in Turkey in the Period of 1946-1960.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Date Formed</th>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Date of Submission Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neumark</td>
<td>Early</td>
<td>Recommending measures for efficient functioning of the govt agencies</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conk and Savun</td>
<td></td>
<td>Recommending measures for rationalization of the bureaucratic organization</td>
<td>Dec, 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barker Mission</td>
<td>March, 1950</td>
<td>Recommending measures for the establishment of an administrative system appropriate to fulfil Turkeys development objectives</td>
<td>May 15, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin and Cush</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Recommending measures for the improvement of administrative procedures in the ministry of finance</td>
<td>August, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leimgruber</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Recommending measures to reform Turkish Public Administration</td>
<td>Dee, 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN working group</td>
<td>May 8, 1952</td>
<td>Recommending plans for establishment and operation of a Public Administration Institute</td>
<td>Sept 6, 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaileux Dentel</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Recommendation measures to improve the Public Personnel system</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Turkish administrations' capability and zeal, on the other hand, were constrained in their ability to "perform a follow-up study of reform, transmit its conclusions forward, and obtain some execution of the suggestions".

Furthermore, no powerful organizations in the politics or society pushed for managerial rectifications "there was little or no systematic critique of administration from universities, government, or elsewhere" (Birkhead, 1967:8, 9).

Foreign specialists often recruited to study Turkish public management and give ideas for improvement since technical support for administrative reform was available. In reality, in the early 1950s, it was common to invite students of public administration from other countries for this reason. Their ideas for improving the administration, on the other hand, received little consideration.

One major factor was that, over time, the goal shifted from making the bureaucracy more efficient and productive to depoliticizing it. This was in reaction to the fact that top government personnel remained intimately affiliated with political elites throughout the single-party period of 1923–1950. (Evin, 1996: 49).

And when the DP came to power in 1950's, the general employees in question considered the DP politicians as counter-elites (Heper, 1985,pp. 67–97). This special technique resulted in a significant controversy with the DP MPs. As a consequence, DP leaders tried to demote bureaucrats to a supporting role in the political system. Local politicians, as well as the DP's national leaders, came to devise of their "roles in larger terms" and began to intervene more freely in administrative issues (Roos and Roos, 1971: 9).

As a consequence of this process, administrative reform as a whole became outdated; instead, politicians concentrated on making administrators virtually loyal to themselves.

**AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTION IN TURKEY IN THE PERIOD OF 1960 to 1980:**

After the military involvement in Turkey, a new constitution was established, development plans were formed, and state-owned enterprises were given a stronger role in the economy. As a consequence, administrative reform became a hot topic once again.

The military leadership did not question the civil bureaucracy since the military intervention was oppose to their political opponents, the DP politicians. In truth, the bureaucratic leaders were seeking to retake their place among the upper crust. In any case, the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the State Personnel Department were established in the early 1960s, giving the civil bureaucracy considerable power and influence.

Attempts at administrative reform during the era in question intended to improve the administrative system's capacity to meet developmental goals contained in the newly formed SPO's development plans and programs (Dodd, 1965).
Indeed, the centrality of bureaucracy in the development process was emphasized in the 1st 5-year Development Plan (1963 to 1967), as well as subsequent yearly development plans.

The basic assumption underlying the administrative reform strategy of the time, as previously stated, was that the administrative system could be considered to have extensive autonomy from other social systems, and thus that administrative performance could be improved by changing the management system itself (Heper, 1971, pp. 420).

In 1962, the Central Government Organization Research Project was commissioned to analyses the central government organization's organizational structure and operations and provide proposals for improvement. It is considered to be the period's largest administrative reform effort. Table 2 shows the results.

**Table 2. Administrative Reforms Commission in Turkey in the 1960-1980 Period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Date Formed</th>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Report Submitted Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government organization research project</td>
<td>Feb, 13, 1962</td>
<td>Examining the distribution of central functions among the central government organizations and making recommendations for the efficient performance of those functions</td>
<td>April 24, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory Board on Administrative Reform</td>
<td>May 29, 1971</td>
<td>Identifying Priorities and strategies in Administrative reform; Evaluating the recommendations of previous Commissions and suggesting implementation Programs</td>
<td>Nov 10, 1971</td>
</tr>
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The following topics were investigated as part of the Central Government Organization:

The division of main government functions such as common functions (e.g., planning, statistics, administrative improvement), traditional functions (e.g., justice, internal affairs, and foreign affairs), financial and economic functions, e.g., financial administration, commerce, industry, culture, education, religious affairs etc. However, it was pointed out in the Project's report that redistribution of tasks alone would not be expected to solve all administrative issues and
shortcomings. Other probable reasons of the bureaucracy's incapacity to fulfil its tasks efficiently and effectively include poor personnel management, a lack of administrative leadership and oversight, extensive bureaucratic processes, and a lack of effective central direction.

For the other side, the Commission on Administrative Reform and Administrative Methods was intended to conduct research in addition by those conducted to Foremost Government Organization Research Project. The latter panel also tasked with doing research on provincial and municipal governments. Because these and other commissions issued their conclusions at a period of political unrest, the majority of their recommendations were not adopted. Turkey had four coalition administrations between 1961 and 1965 (Ahmad, 1977).

None of these frequently shifting administrations had a realistic opportunity to implement the commissioners' recommendations. Furthermore, no central organization was established to coordinate and manage administrative change. Instead, the SPO was tasked with putting the reforms recommended by the commissions into action.

The SPO was already overburdened with other responsibilities and, in any event, understaffed for this role. The SPO has also been harmed by debates concerning its position in Turkish politics and economics. SPD (The State Personnel Department) was then assigned the job of executing the reform measures for a time. Not only did the SPP lack competent employees, but it also encountered significant opposition from ministries and other agencies, who were at the time at odds with the SPD on personnel appointments. Administrative improvements were extraordinarily difficult to implement under these conditions.

The Justice Party (JP) won a majority in parliament during the general elections of 1965. However, as the inheritor party to the DP, which had been deposed by the military, the JP administrations were also hesitant to adopt the reform commissions' recommendations. The reform commissions in issue were seen by the JP administrations as creations of the 1961 military intervention, and hence they were prejudiced against them.

Following the military intervention in 1971, a new reform panel, the Consultative Board for Management Reform, was established. In its report, the Board essentially reaffirmed the results of the Central Government Organization Research Project report and, on the whole, agreed with its recommendations. The prospects of the aforementioned suggestions being adopted in the 1970s were considerably less than in the 1960s. Turkish politics was more fractured and politicized in the 1970s as compare to previous decade. The 1970s were marked by highly conflicted coalition administrations in which every subject was intensely politicized (Heper, 1979–1980). It's hardly surprising, therefore, that administrative reform efforts both the 3rd Five-Year Development Plan (1973 to 1978) and the 4th Five-Year Development Plan (1979 to 1984) made significant contributions failed to move beyond the production of administrative reform packages, resulting in actual and practical outcomes.
Furthermore, similar to the 1960s setup, the duty of harmonizing and overseeing management rectification initiatives was again allocated first to the SPO and subsequently to the SPD in the 1970s, and the follow-up could only be described as sluggish (Tutum, 1994, pp. 120–122).

FROM 1980 TO THE PRESENT TIME PERIOD:

Attempts were undertaken to overhaul the administrative apparatus after the military intervention in September 1980. The military government's reform goals from September, 1980 until December 1983, were primarily focused on the following:

• Functions, power, and responsibility of central government institutions should be redistributed to avoid immoderate centralization.

• Development of a standard organizational framework for ministries, general directorates, and other big government agencies in order to ensure consistency in the fundamental organizational structure of government entities.

• Simplifying bureaucratic processes to cut down on red tape and formality.

• More efficient use of public employees, resulting in a progressive decrease in the number of public employees.

It did better than the previous three goals. There were also field and provincial units of ministries as well as basic line, staff, and auxiliary units for ministries. As a consequence, each ministry created a "training" unit with the same title and hierarchy. The general directorates of the ministries, as well as their field and provincial units, received the same treatment. The purpose was to standardize the government's organizational structure.

Relatively speaking, substantial reforms in the Turkish bureaucracy had not become a priority until the Motherland Party (MP) took power after the general elections of 1983. Above all, the MP administrations pursued a strategy that focused on market forces and attempted to boost Turkey's exports. This program, dubbed "a liberal revolution," was intended to put back the previous economic policies of import substitution and Etatism in general (Rustow, 1987: 2).

In many cases, the new government's export promotion and privatization policies bypassed traditional economic bureaucracy, since Prime Minister Ozal believed that older civil servants had the dynamism required to successfully implement the new economic policies (Atiyas, 1996).

Until 1980, when governments were required to provide some services more reasonably, new agencies (e.g., SPO and SPD) were created while old ones stayed intact. Before the administrative reforms, "technocrats" from universities or the Institute of Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East did substantial study. We've finally abandoned the self-defeating technique of adding additional agencies and reform suggestions "by those in their ivory towers." Instead, a small task force headed by a minister of state was formed. This task force worked with O&M units inside agencies and key officials (Heper, M., & Berkman, Ü. 2002).
The overarching theme was to stimulate initiative, which meant that everyone understood what they were expected to accomplish, according to the reformers. As a result, attempts were made to define function, authority, and duty more clearly. Authority had been proportionate to responsibility, and ambiguous overlaps in function and authority had to be avoided. Act 3046, passed in September 1984, reformed the internal organization of ministries within this framework. A greater distribution of work and coordination among the numerous bureaus meant that a transaction could be completed in one location, and customers wouldn't have to sprint from one agency to the next. As previously stated, these administrative reforms, directed toward the usefulness and implication of bureaucratic processes, as well as the downsizing of the bureaucracy itself, were the outcome of attempts to reorganize the Turkish economy so that market forces would take precedence. The typical economic bureaucracy was bypassed in the process. The Ministry of Finance, for example, was primarily tasked with collecting taxes, while the newly established Under secretariat for Treasury and Foreign Trade was given authority to formulate and administer financial and monetary policy. In a similar spirit, the State Personnel Law was changed to enable private-sector executives to move laterally into the government's top administrative levels. As a result, fresh civil officials were recruited from outside the bureaucracy, with the majority of them having received their education in United States, and they were appointed as heads of commercially essential institutions such as the Central Bank, state banks, and state economic companies. Because many federal servants were now engaged on a contract basis, the civil service positions became less secure. In addition, government personnel including as governors, deputy governors, and police chiefs were appointed based on allegiance to the ruling party (Kozanoglu, 1993).

The MP governments had no intention of making the bureaucracy more lawful and reasonable. Rather, the MP administrations attempted to infuse energy into the commercial bureaucracy by appointing outsiders to lead the bureaucracy's crucial institutions. However, the bureaucracy as a whole continued to operate in the same manner as before. In the 1984–1990 era, the Motherland Party administrations failed to roll back the public sector. Its ancestral qualities remained stronger than its legal-rational characteristics, and the Motherland Party governments failed to roll back the public sector (Omurgonulsen, 1995: 32).

**Conclusion:**

The Turkish Adventure in terms of administrative reform, the conventional thinking is as follows: Administrative reform is more than just a matter of updating organizational charts and instructions. Changes in norms, social connections, and political power structures are all required for administrative reform. It occurs in a sociopolitical setting. Regardless of the scientific quality and validity of administrative reform efforts, the endorsement and support of crucial government officials and powerful socioeconomic groups are critical to administrative reform's success. Moreover, despite of the fact that governments may express apparent support for change in order to improve their image, they may be hesitant to execute reform if they believe it would disrupt key political and bureaucratic balances that benefit them. Similarly, bureaucrats may ensure that
administrative change is successfully limited in order to avoid jeopardizing their authority and status.

In nations where the public bureaucracy exerts significant political influence, the latter position is common. Although political parties, parliaments, and executive branches exist, the bureaucracy is responsible for both policymaking and policy implementations. In comparison to the bureaucracy, political institutions are weak. Intra-bureaucratic politics impact major policy choices, and political concerns become administrative challenges. Thailand in 1960s and Turkey in 1930s and 1940s are also instances of administrative governments.

Attempts to change management techniques in a Weberian way, that is, into a legal-rational bureaucracy, become exceedingly difficult to implement in environments with such a politico-administrative legacy. If the structural and functional reorganization follows the Weberian model, administrative standards will remain unchanged; practice will fall well short of the ideal.

The Turkish rectification experience also demonstrates that administrative change is inextricably linked to events that occur in the aftermath of political upheavals. In this way, several of the other nations' experiences are similar. Administrative changes were begun shortly following military takeovers in Pakistan, Venezuela, South Korea, Burma, Ghana, and Peru, to name a few instances. For example, after the 1958 crisis in Lebanon, Indonesia after Sukarno lost power and position, Nigeria after the civil war, and Pakistan after Ayub Khan's departure from power in 1969 administrative reforms were implemented.

Such crises conditions provide administrative reform attempts a boost. Administrative change, on the other hand, is not a one-time event. Persistent efforts are required to see it through. Following big crises, many reform ideas emerge; but, once the dust settles, the old patterns reappear, and reform attempts are stymied.

REFERENCES


The Justice Party (JP)
State Planning Organization (SPO)
Democratic Party (DP)
State Personnel Department (SPD)
Motherland Party (MP)